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The signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship opened
a new era in Japanese foreign policy. By improving relations
with Peking, Tokyo gained the latitude of action necessary
to play a central role in creating a pattern of regional
stability compatible with Japan's national interests in
security, prosperity, and prestige. The decision to sign
the treaty underscores the determining influence these
traditional national interests have on contemporary Japanese
foreign policy, and it highlights the dichotomy between
Japan's culturally induced xenophobic proclivities and its
economic needs for greater access to foreign raw materials.
Reflecting Japan's departure from its post World War II
international reticence, the Peace and Friendship Treaty,
as a function of national interests, is a useful analytical
tool for assessing the impact of a more vigorous Japanese
foreign policy on the Sino-Soviet dispute, the application
of the Nixon Doctrine, the stability of Southeast Asia,
the reunification of Korea, the future of Taiwan and the
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 19 70s it has become a cliche to point out that
Japan can no longer pursue a passive foreign policy driven
primarily by economic expediency and reliance on the United
States for security. Japan's emergence as the third strongest
economy in the world is succinct testimony to its success-
ful adaptation to Washington's dominant influence in the
post-World War II bipolar era. But bipolarity, except in a
nuclear strategic sense, is passe and so is Japan's trading
company approach to foreign policy. No longer does the
American dollar or Minuteman ICBM dominate the international
scene; instead, Tokyo must be prepared to face a world where
the Soviet Union has achieved nuclear parity with the U.S.,
where Cold War conditions have been dissipated by more prag-
matic interests, and where Japan, along with the Western
Europe and the resource producing states, enjoys an increasing
degree of economic influence.
Undoubtedly, the Nixon Shocks of 1971, the Oil Crisis of
1973-74, and the dramatic events in Southeast Asia since 1972
have all coalesced to convince the Japanese that they must
develop a more activist foreign policy, independent of but
in conjunction with the U.S., in order to maintain Japan's
2
new position in today's multipolar world. Nonetheless,
Tokyo is finding it difficult to abandon, for any number of
domestic and international reasons , the low keyed ad hoc

economically oriented approach to foreign affairs that has
served its interests so well since the end of the Occupation
3in 1952. Clearly, Japan's circumspect attitudes on nego-
tiating a peace and friendship treaty (PFT) with China, as
called for in the Chou-Tanaka communique of 1972, can be
justified in terms of the serious ramifications such an
agreement would have on the Asian security equation, but
this high degree of caution also suggests that Japan is not
adjusting easily to the contemporary need to broaden the basis
of its foreign policy beyond economics and the American
security alliance.
In many ways, Tokyo's approach to the PFT synthesizes
the inherent cultural and political difficulties Japan is
experiencing in transitioning from a passive to a more
activist foreign policy. Not only does the study of Japan's
decision to sign the PFT on 12 August 1978 highlight these
tensions but it also shows the linkage between Japanese
domestic party politics and Japan's foreign policy output.
Furthermore, because the PFT has implications for all the
major security issues in Asia, an analysis of Japan's posi-
tion on such an agreement should provide some insight on
what direction a more vigorous approach to international
relations might take the Japanese with regard to the Sino-
Soviet dispute, the future of Taiwan, the continuance of
the American alliance, peace in Korea, resource rights in
the East China Sea, and Japan's economic survival.

Assuming the PFT to be a valuable analytical construct
for identifying Japanese national interests and their effects
on Japan's emerging foreign policy, this study will use the
treaty as a reference point for focusing on the nature and
meaning of national interests. From this framework the
cultural context to Japan's search for a more independent
foreign policy through improved relations with China will be
developed. After establishing this cultural context, the
question of whether closer ties with China and the conclusion
of the PFT is in Japan's best interest will be used as a
backdrop to scrutinize the interaction between Japanese
domestic politics and foreign policy. With this foundation,
the positive and negative implications of the PFT on Japan's
current problematic situation of bolstering its security,
maintaining its economic prosperity and enhancing its
4international status can be addressed.

II. THE PHILOSOPHY AND MEANING
OF NATIONAL INTERESTS
The negotiations called for in the Chou-Tanaka communique
"aimed at the conclusion of a treaty of peace and friendship"
took six years to complete even though a prima facia case
exists showing that China and Japan have, since reestab-
lishing diplomatic relations in 1972, both perceived the
PFT to be in their national interests. If complete
normalization was a policy goal of Peking and Tokyo, why did
this issue remain unresolved for so long, and why was 1978
believed to be a time "ripe for negotiations on the treaty"?
The answer to these questions lies to some degree in under-
standing the affects of national interests on the behavior
of nation states.
Consequently, before examining the potential impact of
the PFT on the specific national interests of Japan, a more
precise analysis of the metaphysics of national interests
is needed. Using the evolvement and Japan's movement toward
the completion of its peace and friendship treaty with China
as a case in point, an endeavor will be made to build a
conceptual framework for understanding the relationship
between national interests and foreign policy. Elements
to be examined include the amorphous nature of the concept,
the major analytical methods for studying national interests,
and the important criticisms of using national interests as
a basis for making or understanding policy. From this
10

examination an operational definition of national interest
which can be used to assess the impact of the Sino-Japanese
peace and friendship treaty will be presented.
A. NATIONAL INTERESTS: THEIR AMORPHOUS NATURE
Thought of axiomatically and loosely used, the term
national interest is not easy to define and "political and
scholarly discussions on the national interest have tended
to produce either simplistic generalizations or scholastic
sophistry." This difficulty with definition can be traced
to two inherent characteristics of national interest.
First, national interests "are highly generalized
abstractions that reflect each state's basic wants and needs."
The Chou-Tanaka Communique's statement that "The normalization
of relations and the development of good neighborly and
friendly relations between the two countries are in the
interests of the two people, and will also contribute to
the relaxation of tension in Asia and the safeguard of world
peace" is a typical example of the vague tautological style
used to express national interests. Consequently, there is
a legitimate concern among students of the subject that the
"great generalities" of the phrase "national interest" may
obscure the fact that nations often conduct their foreign
policies on the basis of achieving specific often short term
goals, and that these identifiable policy objectives are a
more accurate gauge for analyzing a nation's political
behavior than the vague abstract concept of national interest.'
11

Besides its abstractness , a second characteristic
contributing to the perplexity of national interest is
its dynamic nature. National interests are not immutable,
but are shaped by the interaction of a nation's cultural
value system with the constantly changing international
environment modified by the state's material wants and
capabilities. Of course, none of these factors affecting
national interests are themselves static making the combina-
tions and permutations of their interaction difficult to
empiricize.
The unadulterated fact that both China and Japan have
stated that the conclusion of a peace and friendship treaty
is in their mutual national interests demonstrates how
radically national interests can change. In the early days
of the Cold War both China and Japan formally aligned them-
selves against each other via superpower surrogates in order
to protect their national security interests, promote their
economic recovery, and prevent external interference with
their domestic political institutions. With the shift from
bipolarity to multipolar world, due in great measure to
their own political and economic resurgence, China and
Japan's national interests have become more complementary
and better served, since the Sino-Soviet split and American
rapprochement with Peking, by pragmatic cooperation than
by ideological based antagonism. The point being, that the
international environment has changed considerably since the
early 1950s and so has Japan's national interests.
12

Difficult though the concept of national interest may
be to pin down because of its abstractness and dynamic
nature, it must be remembered that these are essential
qualities in its composite makeup. As in the physical
sciences, problems associated with measurement are not
sufficient grounds for dismissal of the phenomena. Not
only does the term "national interest" remain in the lexicon
of foreign policy, it is used by ruling elites and political
scientists alike for discerning and explaining a country's
foreign policy.
B. NATIONAL INTEREST: TRADITIONAL METHODS OF ANALYSIS
Traditionally, two approahces have been used to fix the
characteristics of a national interest, though neither is
without defect. One school contends that national interests
are most accurately defined by deducing them from a careful
empirical study of a nation's policy output. For example,
China's steadfast refusal to accept anything but minimum
short term credit arrangements, despite the advantages of
a more liberal debt policy for achieving rapid industriali-
zation demonstrated not only the dynamic interaction of
interests but also leaves little latitude for concluding
other than that economic independence is an important Chinese
national interest. Turning to Japan, Tokyo's former reluc-
tance to enter into any peace and friednship treaty with
China that included an anti-hegemony clause is a positive
display of Japan's interest in a policy of equidistance
13

between China and the Soviet Union to keep from being sucked
into the vortex of the Sino-Soviet dispute. 12
A major deficiency of the deductive method for defining
national interests on the basis of actual policy output
is that it takes no account of what a nation's interests
and policies should be. For instance, perhaps China's long
term interests might be better served by a more enlightened
attitude toward borrowing, or Japan's security and economic
position improved by tilting towards one of its communist
neighbors, but the deductive method avoids such normative
questions by concentrating on what a nation does as the key
indicator of what its interests are. Furthermore, this
approach not only exaggerates short term objectives at the
expense of long term interests, it also infers that a nation's
interest are limited by the government's ability to bring
them to fruition.
A second methodological approach for getting a grip on
13
national interests is analysis based on logical induction.
This school postulates that there are certain irreducible
national interests such as physical survival, territorial
integrity, political independence, economic subsistence,
etc., from which a nation's interests can be inductively
extrapolated. If one postulates that China's "primary
14
interest" is survival, both politically and physically,
then Peking's seeking an anti-hegemonic peace and friendship
treaty with Japan is a logical manifestation of this
irreducible national interest because it would both thwart
14

Soviet efforts to contain China while making Japanese capital
and technology more accessible for the modernization of
the People's Republic. Accepting the proposition that free
trade is essential to the existence of lightly armed and
resource poor Japan, then the emphasis Tokyo has placed on
assuring its access to raw materials and export markets,
while also promoting a stable political environment to
minimize the need for armed forces, is not surprising.
Inductive reasoning suggests that because free trade and
political stability are irreducible Japanese interests,
improved relations with China, through the conclusion of the
PFT is a logical policy alternative for achieving these
goals. Not only can China provide Japan with needed raw
materials and possible export markets, but closer political
ties between Asia's most populous nation and its most
economically developed state could provide a forum for
defusing potentially explosive Asian issues such as the
superpower's role in regional security, control of the East
China Sea shelf resources, the status of Taiwan, and compe-
1
6
tition for expanding Sourtheast Asian markets.
The obvious difficulty with the inductive approach is
determining and defining what the value laden term "irreduci-
ble interests" means. Because of their near universal
applicability and relativistic nature, meaning different
things to different nations at different times, phrases such
as survival, international stability and economic development
15

are actually just synonyms that shed little light on the
meaning of national interest. As Sonderman suggest, "such
terms as survival, self-preservation, independence, sover-
eignty usually said to constitute the rock-bottom purpose
of the foreign policies of states will be found, upon
17
closer inspection, to hide a host of ambiguities."
This leads to the observation that both the deductive and
the inductive methods provide only a lens for focusing on the
nature of national interest; but neither provides a denota-
tive definition as to which approach is more efficacious,
it clearly depends on which interest is under consideration
and what evidence is available. By their quantifiable nature,
certain economic goals may be more prone to deductive analy-
sis than security interests which are more affected by per-
ceptions. Regardless of whether or not the interest is
quantifiable, the absence of sufficient policy output or
where there is no discernable pattern to a nation's policy in
a given area, the inductive method may be the only viable
avenue open. The significance here is that even the analyti-
cal methodology for studying the concept of national interest
is infected to some degree by the abstract and dynamic nature
of the phenomena under investigation.
C. NATIONAL INTERESTS: ARE THEY RELEVANT?
Since neither methodology adequately cuts through the
ambiguities associated with the abstract and dynamic nature
of a nation's national interests, many observers reject the
16

concept of "national interest" as a means for explaining
national behavior because of the lack of clear casual links
between a state's interests and its foreign policy. Those
who see the concept of national interest as devoid of
relevance usually level one of five criticisms.
1. The concept of national interest
is too broad and all inconclusive
to be meaningful. George and
Keohane reckon that "in practice
. . . national interest has become so
elastic and ambiguous a concept
that its role as a guide to foreign
policy is problematical and
controversial.
"
2. The traditional difficulty in dis-
tinguishing ends from means con-
fuses the specifics of the national
interest concept, which is meant
to elucidate the ends or purposes
of foreign policy.
3. There is no clear method or formula
in most governments for determining
national interests. The legitimacy
of the national interests can be
quickly eroded by questioning not
only what the national interests are,




Because of its positive rhetorical
appeal, the concept of national
interest is a political tool which
can be retroactively applied to
policy outputs in order to justify
action, hide mistakes, rationalize
policies, and disarm the opposition.
5. The concept of national interest is
anachronistic in the growing inter-
dependence of the modern world.
J. Martin Rochester contends that
the national interest in today's
world "runs squarely up against
what a number of observers believe
to be major new forces in world





concern for the environment, allo-
cation of dwindling resources, etc.
Certainly a case can be made that all these criticisms
are germane to any consideration of China and Japan's
interest in concluding a peace and friendship treaty. The
careful wording of the Chou-Tanaka communique, which is
accepted by both nations as the basis for their relations,
is written in language open to broad interpretation since
it places no obligations on either party. Furthermore,
Japan's reconsideration of China's demand for the inclusion
of an anti-hegemonic clause in the treaty and Peking's
acceptance of the third country caveat infers a degree of
19
elasticity in both nation's interests.
Questions can also be raised about whether improved
relations between China and Japan are in the long term
national interest of either nation or merely a means for
achieving immediate ends in Asia such as containment of the
Soviet Union for China, or diversification of resource
supplies for Japan. The motives of each side can also be
imputed as representative not of national interests but of
special interests. A reasoned argument can be made that
there are factions within China's ruling elite that do not
support Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's pragmatic non-
ideological approach of seeking foreign technology for the
modernization of China, and are particularly opposed to more
20intimate ties with Japan. In Japan, the Asian Problems

Study Group, which represents Japanese financial interests
in Taiwan, has historically opposed other factions in the
ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that favor increased
21Sino-Japanese political and economic intercourse. Naturally,
supporters of the treaty in both Peking and Tokyo claim that
the pact is essential to the national interests of both coun-
tries, but it is difficult to differentiate the rhetoric
from the substance.
There is also the problem of determining to what degree
China's public statements about Japan are influenced by the
machinations of the Sino-Soviet dispute and concurrently,
how Japan's position on the PFT is affected by its relations
with the United States, Taiwan or the Soviet Union. Finally,
the willingness of both sides to defer the question of
sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands and associated ocean
resources can be seen as supporting Rochester's contention
that even classically obvious national interests may be of
little value in explaining nation-state behavior in today's
22
context of dwindling resources.
Even so, these criticisms about the relevance of national
interests to real politics seem hollow despite their academic
soundness. There remains an intuitive connection between a
state's national interests and its policies, which is as
difficult to dispell as it is to prove. Because of its
value as conceptual scheme within which goals can be arranged,
policy makers continue to use the term "national interest"
23
to at least explain, if not determine their decisions.
19

Consequently, the relationship between national interests
and foreign policy can be questioned but not ignored.
D. NATIONAL INTERESTS: AN OPERATIONAL DEFINITION
Because of this apparently inate relationship between
interests and policies, identifying the elements that make
up this linkage may reduce the abstractions and dynamics
associated with the concept of national interests. As some
observers insist, the meaning of national interest can most
accurately be discerned not by simply looking at a nation's
"policy output" or reasoning a priori from certain "irreduci-
ble interests," but by scrutinizing the interaction of a
state's cultural context with the problematic situations it
24faces through the political system it has developed.
This approach infers that rather than concentrating on the
epistemology of national interest, as the deductive and
inductive methods do, it would be more productive to develop
an operational definition of national interest by focusing
on what the concept should mean to have functional validity.
First to be a useful construct for determining or under-
standing a government's foreign policy, a nation's national
interests should reflect its basic philosophic and pragmatic
values. Concommitantly, these values should also be indicative
of what means are acceptable to the nation for pursuing these
interests. As an example, China and Japan both are ethno-
centric nations that place a high premium on cultural integrity
This primarily is a result of China's preponderant influence
20

in East Asia over time and Japan's insular geography.
Regardless of its origin , cultural integrity has a thoroughly
documented subliminal value to each society which need not
be articulated to bias the policies of either China or
Japan. It would seem that Japan's administrative barriers
to foreign manufactured goods and China's reluctance to
become dependent on foreign capital, despite their economic
soundness, are in actually manifestations of a deep concern
for maintaining cultural purity. As for the importance of
values in establishing acceptable parameters of action,
clear examples exist in Japan's constitutional rejection of
the right of war and China's past resistance to mortgaging
its dependence to accelerate modernization.
Besides fundamental values, a nation's national interests
are also generated by its more immediate needs which provide
a rubric for prioriticizing them. Unquestionably, proble-
matic needs associated with the vitality of the state demand
solutions and these crystalize interests. If resources and
export markets are needed, these will create an interest in
free trade; a need for a more modern industrial plant will
engender an interest in acquiring foreign technology. Con-
cerning the peace and friendship treaty, the intersection of
Peking and Tokyo's desire for political stability in East
Asia coupled with Japan's need to diversify its sources of
25
raw materials and China's need for foreign technology
explain in large part their mutual interest in the PFT. But
21

a nation's needs may be at cross purposes with each other,
or more importantly in conflict with the state's basic
value system, thus creating a serious policy dilemma for the
governing elite. For instance, stability and economic
development are obviously not China and Japan's only needs,
hence the deliberate pace of the treaty negotiations.
Certainly, questions of security and the reaction of the
United States and the Soviet Union to closer Sino-Japanese
ties have influenced Tokyo's position on the advisability of
seeking closer ties with Peking. Likewise, China's policy on
a treaty of this sort has been more affected by a need to
neutralize Moscow's influence in Asia and to reassert
sovereignty over its "lost territories", particularly Taiwan,
than by its need for fully normalized relations with Japan.
The criticality of these competing needs to the survival of
the state as an effective international unit, however, does
provide a ready formula for placing these derive interests
in priority order.
Even so, values and needs remain nebulous abstractions
until translated into policy by a nation r s formal and
informal political institutions. In fact, the political
process is really the cybernetic link between a nation's
long term values and more immediate needs. Essentially, a
nation's political institutions and decision making process
evolve from the continuous impact of the state's cultural
26
context on its current problematic situation and vice versa.
22

The lesson to be gleaned is that the bureaucratic
hierarchical nature of the Chinese system and the factional
consensus methodology of policy formation in Japan not only
identifies significant philosophical traits that differen-
tiate the two societies, these non-congruent political systems
also infer that a mutuality of need may not necessarily
result in a commonality of interest or policy. Briefly
then, a nation's political system is, in effect, its per-
ceptual equipment for both identifying and reacting to its
national interests
.
Summarizing these particulars, an operational definition
of national interests is suggested by this subjectively
perceptible, if not fully understandable, linkage between a
nation's values, needs and political system. Certainly this
definition can be faulted because it says little or nothing
about how these three variables interact to form national
interests, but it does specify which elements are essential
to the concept. It also has the advantage of implicitly
recognizing the abstract and dynamic character of national
interests; nor does it require a quantitative analysis of
a qualitative subject. Furthermore, it is as equally useful
to the decision maker in formulating foreign policy as it
is to the analyst trying to ferret out the purpose of the
policy.
Asserting that national interests drive foreign policy,
the succeeding analysis will make use of this operational
definition as point of departure for examining the potential
23

impact of the PFT on Japan's national interests. An attempt
will be made to isolate and analyze how the treaty relates
to the values deprived from Japan's cultural context, to the
Japanese methodology for policy making, and to the current
problematic challenges facing Japanese foreign policy.
Hopefully such an exercise will identify what Japan's
national interests are. Heuristically , this study should
italicize the major sources of international friction in
Northeast Asia and provide a case study understanding of the
influence national interests have on Japanese foreign policy
24

III. THE CULTURAL CONTEXT TO JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY
It is often argued that Japan's post-World War II capacity
to discern its own interests and act accordingly has seriously
atrophied under the prevailing influence of the American
alliance, resulting in the current atmosphere of confusion
. . 27
amongst Japanese decision makers. This assertion has
appeal because it provides both a plausible explanation for
Japan's present policy dilemma and is easily documented.
While America's patronage has certainly allowed Japan to
avoid tough questions of security and international politics
during its "economic miracle", it would be inaccurate to
infer that this is the root cause of Japan's discomfiture in
today's multi-polar environment. Actually Japan's awkward
response to its need for a more independent foreign policy
does not stem from American domination; rather, it has its
origin in the clash between what Japan as a modern nation-
state requires for a successful foreign policy and the
28historically developed attributes of Japanese society.
Because of this tension between Japan's pragmatic foreign
policy needs and its introverted societal traits, an under-
standing of Japan's cultural context is essential to gauging
the impact of the PFT on Japan's foreign policy. This can
be done by cataloguing the more significant premises of
Japanese culture and presenting an historical survey of how




A. THE CULTURAL PREMISES OF JAPANESE NATIONAL INTERESTS
With the possible exception of Great Britain, Japan's
cultural context is uniquely molded by the amalgamation of
insular geography, cultural homogeneity, and foreign influ-
ences. Besides this almost unparalleled combination of
cultural determinants, their impact on the modern Japanese
psyche is magnified by their uninterrupted interaction for
almost twenty centuries. As a result, periods of intensive
borrowing from other nations have not torn the fabric of
29Japanese culture.
Turning to the impact of geography, Edwin Reischauer
unequivocally states "the chief reason for Japan's distinc-
tive role in East Asian civilization is probably its location
as a relatively remote island country. " Not only has
insularity permitted Japanese cultural and economic develop-
ment to proceed unfettered by mass migrations or unwanted
foreign philosophies, it also, until the advent of strategic
nuclear delivery systems, effectively protected Japan from
foreign invasion. Blessed with a well protected hospitable
environment, but one racked by periodic natural disasters
such as typhoons and earthquakes, the Japanese, reenforced
by Buddhist and Shinto beliefs, have developed a passive
philosophical outlook for dealing with nature. According
to this "awase" perspective man is best served by adapting
to nature rather than trying to manipulate it.
Adapting to its moated geography, Japan has traditionally
not perceived the need for a large military establishment to
26

insure security. Imbued with the kamikaze spirit and the
experience of Tokugawa isolation, the Japanese have not
generally exercised themselves about the physical protection
31
of their island homeland. Even though missiles and air-
craft have antiquated Japan's oceanic shield, and access to
international sea lanes has become mandatory for the function-
ing of its industrial society, the Japanese people remain
content with a constitution that questions the advisability
of using military force and an alliance that delegates
32Japan's strategic defense to the United States.
Another natural derivative of Japan's insularity is the
homogeneity of its people. Physically detached from the
Asian mainland, assimilation of Japan's early inhabitants
into a racially pure stock with its own distinctive language
33
was completed by the ninth century A.D. Coupling ehtnic
and linguistic homogeneity with the natural geographic
boundaries of their landfall, the Japanese people developed
an early sense of national identity — modern nationalism.
As a result, the Japanese are acutely aware of their racial
heritage and have historically placed the well being of
34
society above the pursuit of individual welfare. This
nationalistically motivated submission of the individual to
the needs of society also explains in part Japan's continuing
stress on acquiescence to authority, the importance of con-
formity, and a predilection for group action versus singular
endeavors. Japan's strong Confucian identification with a
27

hierarchical mode of interpersonal relations has also shown
itself in a sensitivity to Japan's status in the international
community and an inability to deal with other states as
equals.
Despite the obvious advantages of racial and linguistic
homogeneity for encouraging the evolution of an orderly
society and promoting relative economic prosperity, these
same factors have also led to a pronounced sense of ethno-
centric conservatism in the Japanese people. Not only does
this ethnocentricity make the Japanese naturallly suspicious
of anything foreign, but because of a lack of external
stimuli the Japanese have experienced difficulty in under-
35
standing the attitudes and actions of other peoples.
As a result of this unchallenged homogeneity, Japan has an
introverted tradition in the field of foreign affairs, which
has been abetted by the complexities of the Japanese language.
Furthermore, this geographically spawned cultural sameness
has produced a schizophrenic sense of separateness among the
Japanese people. Over time this schizophrenia has manifested
itself in both an exaggerated perception of national superiority
3 6
and an agitated sense of isolation.
Neither Japan's geographic remoteness nor its ethno-
centric conservatism, however, could dim the brilliance of
China's T ' ang Dynasty (612-907) to the Japanese court at
Yamato. Titillated by the gradual introduction of Buddhism
from China, Japan's intellectuals .and ruling class showed
a precocious pragmatism about borrowing selected attributes
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from a culture in order to strengthen Japan. Historically,
Japan's tradition of examining foreign models for useful
traits of a transferable nature can be traced back to
Prince Shotoku's (578-621) embassies to the imperial capital
of Ch'ang-an and continued by subsequent Japanese rulers
until 894. As a consequence of these three centuries of
tutelage, Chinese advances in government, philosophy, religion,
architecture, art, literature, and semantics were incor-
porated by the Japnese into their collective knowledge, and
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a lasting affinity for Chinese culture was forged.
Perhaps more important than the substantive contributions
to Japanese culture resulting from this early emulation of
China is the precedent it established and the subjective
impact such cultural borrowing continues to have on Japan's
collective personality. Despite an almost one thousand
year hiatus since the high point of aggressive cultural
borrowing from China, the mid-nineteenth century challenge
of European and American influence in Asia induced progressive
elements in Japan to end the feudal Shogunate in 18 6 8 and
gird their homeland against western encroachment by actively
modernizing Japan's military, economic, social, and govern-
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mental institutions by applying Occidental learning. The
next significant period of cultural borrowing after the Meiji
Restoration occurred during the Cold War, when the U.S. must
have appeared as a modern T'ang dynasty to war-damaged Japan.
The Occupation (1945-1952) certainly directed the Japanese
towards the American economic and political system as the
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most appropriate model for the successful reconstruction
40
of their nation, but there can be little question about the
positive effects U.S. industry, technology, and financial
assistance have had on Japanese society. As with China,
this felicitous absorption of American principles resulted
in a Japanese fondness for things American and a desire for
expanded bilateral relations.
In assessing the Japanese approach to cultural borrowing
it is interesting to note that the cultures selected for
emulation — China, Western Europe, and the U.S. — were at
the time not only more advanced than Japan, but also capable
of dominating East Asia militarily. By learning from these
particular cultures Japan hoped not only to strengthen its
own society, but in the process to gain the esteem of these
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more powerful potential adversaries. Most Japanese
scholars infer that this borrowing created a subliminal
sense of inferiority aggravated by Japan's racial homogeneity.
According to this interpretation, the very act of borrowing
represents a tacit self-acknowledgement by the Japanese of
the superiority of the foreign culture, and this realization
has historically created a natural tension with Japan's strong
sense of cultural identity, which in turn has motivated the
Japanese to vigorously improve upon the items appropriated
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from abroad in order to assuage this feeling of inferiority.
In brief, the Japanese record of successfully adapting foreign
advances to its cultural moorings has affected the collective
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national psyche by simultaneously arousing positive feelings
about Japna's superior uniqueness from other nations, while
also generating a subtle sense of inferiority.
The interaction of Japan's insular geography, ethnic
homogeneity, and recpetivity to foreign innovation has
synthesized a traditional outlook towards international
relations characterized by:
1. A deep rooted sense of national
identify and uniqueness from other
cultures
.
2. A hierarchical understanding of
international relations which stressed
authority and conformity.
3. An intense concern about improving
Japan's international status,
which has motivated periods of
extended cultural borrowing from
more advanced societies.
4. A submerged fear of isolation and
subliminal inferiority complex.
5. A passive attitude about world
events which recommends adapting to
the international situation instead
of trying to change it.
6. An abbreviated diplomatic experience
and historical freedom from security
threats due to Japan's geographic
setting.
7. A premium on decision by consensus,
resulting from Japan's authori-
tarian traditions and cultural
homogeneity
.
Collectively, these traits have defined the parameters
of Japanese thinking about foreign affairs, and the new demands
of today's multipolar world, withstanding, they are still
germane to the development of Japan's contemporary foreign
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policy. Tokyo's mixed reactions towards negotiating the PFT
with China reflect this continued relevance, but they also
demonstrate the incompatibility between Japan's cultural
context and its present problematic situation.
For example, Japan's long term desire since the days of
Prime Minister Yoshida for its own identifiable China policy
has been thwarted by a need for conformity to America's post
World War II China policy and more recently by the Sino-
Soviet dispute. Tokyo's interest in political and economic
access to China has been balanced by fears of antagonizing
the Soviet Union and alienating the United States. In fact,
Japan's passive attitude and resultant concern about Soviet,
American and Taiwanese reaction to the PFT caused the
Chinese to wonder during the course of the negotiations
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about Japan's sincerity in seeking such a pact.
The xenophobic dynamics of Japanese culture are further
sensitized by Japan's growing dependence on overseas
resources and markets and the threat posed to the Japanese
Islands by modern weapons technology. In essence, the cross
pressures between Japan's need for external connections and
its insular ethnic homogeneity have produced a foreign policy
that lacks direction and is not completely synchronized with
the needs of a modern nation state. This lack of syncrhoni-




B. THE HISTORICAL MANIFESTATIONS OF JAPAN'S NATIONAL INTERESTS
Regardless, Japan's entrenched cultural context remains
the qualitative norm against which today's generation of
Japanese judge the acceptability of their foreign policy.
But a nation's cultural context is not a static given;
rather, it is both shaped and modified by the state's
historical experience. In Japan's case the accelerated
transition from a feudal agrarian society to a modern indus-
trial state in less than a century underscores this point.
The historical forces affecting Japan since the Meiji Restora-
tion, though tempered by the Japanese cultural context, have
contributed significantly to the formation of current atti-
tudes on foreign policy in general and the PFT in particular.
For purposes of analysis, Japan's modern history can be
divided into four periods based on the type of foreign policy
goals pursued. The Tokugawa era (1603-1868) isolated Japan
from the threatening effects of foreign influence; during the
Meiji Restoration (1868-1889) Japan successfully became
competitive with the west through modernization and indus-
trialization; in the age of intense nationalism (1889-1945)
Japan pursued its political and economic interests through
a policy of imperialistic expansionism; finally the Showa
generation (1945-present) has concentrated on an economic
non-political approach to foreign policy.
Individually, each of these periods is important because
of the substantive influence they have had on the evolvement
of today's Asian security calculus, and Tokyo's current
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attitudes about the conduct of foreign affairs. Collectively,
this history shows the wide range of fluctuation in Japanese
interests over time and Tokyo's pragmatic, non-doctrinaire
approach to international relations.
Briefly, the renowned isolation of Japan by the Tokugawa
Shoguns was not a foreign policy but a domestic program
designed to prevent any changes in the social order that
44
might threaten the ascendancy of the ruling family.
Fearful of Christian missionaries with their allegiance to
the Pope, western traders who could disrupt the Japanese
45
economy, an edict was issued in 16 36 terminating all Japanese
activity abroad, enjoining the construction of seagoing
ships, promising death to any Japanese who returned from a
foreign country and restricting foreign shipping (primarily
Dutch and Chinese) to Nagasaki.
By all accounts , the Tokugawa Shogunate was supremely
successful in maintaining its rule by arresting change.
Besides sealing Japan off form the technological advances
of industrial revolution, the isolation also conditioned
the Japanese to view foreign involvement and change as
detrimental to Japan's national interests. Furthermore,
the isolation demonstrated that Japan could deal with
difficult foreign policy issues by avoiding them.
The persistence of these attitudes is reflected in
Japan's post-World War II aloofness from controversial inter-
national issues. During the Tokugawa era Japan isolated
itself from the international community in order to protect
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the power base of its ruling elite; since 1945, Tokyo has
routinely deferred taking any foreign policy initiatives
for fear of their negative impact on Japan's economic strength
Japan's cautious approach towards concluding the PFT can be
explained in terms of dodging the Sino-Soviet dispute and
a concern about the long term economic effects of being
foreclosed from Soviet resources and markets.
Commodore Perry is commonly popularized for ending
Japan's isolation in 1854. More accurately, his forceful
representation of American military and economic interests
in the Western Pacific was a catalyst for unleasing the
latent forces of commercial and social change pent up by
the anachronism of Tokugawa rule. The Tokugawa imposition
of political stability created a favorable environment for
the rapid expansion of a modern urban economy. This resulted
in wealth being transferred from the land-holding daimyo to
the merchant class without a commensurate shift in political
47power because of a strict Confucian social ordering. In
this milieu of economic and political change, enlightened
Japanese were also growing more apprehensive about the ease
with which modern military technology allowed the western
powers to carve up China into sphere's of influence.
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The ensuing Meiji Restoration brought the industrial
revolution to Japan and associated the modernization of the
Japanese state with the national interest, an association
that is not spent even today. Impressed by the formidable
firepower displayed by the western fleets in their bombardment
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of Kagoshima and Shimonoseki, and resentful of the political
humiliation Japan was forced to endure because of its
military backwardness, the ruling clique of the Meiji
Restoration became resolute about transforming Japan into
a nation that could hold its own in the modern world. Per-
ceptively, Japan's new samurai leaders realized that to
match the west's military power, Japan would need a complete
economic, social, political, and intellectual renovation.
In short, this program of rapid modernization represented
a revolution, but not one fomented on the streets. Instead,
it was masterminded in the corridors of government and guided
by a handful of energetic leaders united in their desire to
make Japan the equal of any major power. Certainly, one
purpose of this revolution was to prevent a repetition in
Japan of China's post-Opium Wars experience with the west.
The Charter Oath taken by the Emperor on 8 April 1868
set the tone for the Meiji Restoration and effectively
countermanded the isolationist traditions of Tokugawa.
Besides declaring feudal customs to be outmoded and legiti-
mating consultative assemblies, the Charter Oath recognized
the need for assimilating western knowledge. In the fifth
article of the oath the Emperor proclaims, "knowledge shall
be sought throughout the world and thus the welfare of the
49
Empire will be promoted.
"
Clearly, the events of the 1850s and 1860s gave the
Japanese a healthy respect for occidental power, convincing
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the Empire's new ruling elite that the only defense against
western encroachment was to adopt western industrial skills
and military technology. Unable "to expell the barbarians"
with Japan's outdated economy and military, the rallying
cry of the Meiji court became "rich country, strong army."
Like the Meiji Restoration/ the conclusion of the PFT also
represents a transition from a passive to a more activist
foreign policy. Both the Restoration and the PFT have in
common the quality of compromise with the security and
economic realities of Japan's external environment.
Within a generation, the Meiji Restoration had trans-
formed Japan into a modern military industrial power. This
spectacular metamorphosis was possible because of the social
and economic foundation left by Tokugawa; because Japan could
simply borrow proven technological advances and economic prin-
ciples from the west; and because the modernization process
was astutely managed by the Meiji leadership. Industrializa-
tion was encouraged through access to foreign technology,
easy credit and government subsidies, all supervised and
coordinated by the new Ministry of Industry. Universal
military conscription, instituted in 1873, not only strengthened
Japan but also tempered the frictions of class distinction
by involving the masses in Japan's esteemed samurai tradition.
The Restoration's insistence on universal education also
made Japan the first nation in Asia with a literate population,
an essential element for developing a technocratic society.
Each of these government innovations, it should be noted,
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were not meant to benefit the individual citizen, but to
improve Japan as a whole. The goal of the Meiji Restoration
was not Jeffersonian democracy but "rich country, strong
military.
"
The Meiji Restoration is important to Japan's current
foreign policy because the Japanese association of techno-
logical prowess and economic capacity with the survival of
the state has its genesis in this era. More significantly,
it demonstrates, in unison with the Tokugawa isolationist
policy, that when Japan senses a serious external challenge
it can adapt with alacrity and in such a way as to take
advantage of the situation instead of being threatened by
it. This point seems particularly germane to Japan today as
current patterns of security and economics change with
increasing international interdependence. It would seem
that Japan's closer alignment with China through the PFT may
be a signal that Tokyo again sees the world changing and is
ready to embark on a major reassessment of its security and
economic policies. Events subsequent to 18 6 8 show how
drastically such reassessments can change Japan's foreign
policy posture.
In the twenty years of social, political, and economic
change that followed the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese also
developed an imperialistic mentality. Looking to the west
as a model for modernization, the Japanese were struck by
the correlation between colonial holdings and Great Power
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status. If Japan was to achieve its goal of "rich country,
strong military" and be accepted as an equal by the western
powers, an overseas empire seemed a prerequisite in the
later part of the nineteenth century. Not only would control
over resource-rich areas in Manchuria and Korea stoke Japan's
growing industrial machine; such holdings would also enhance
Japanese security by curbing the expansion of the western
powers, particularly Tsarist Russia, into East Asia.
Besides practical considerations of security and
economics, Japanese imperialism was fueled by the nation's
lingering samurai traditions and a strong resurgence of
emotional nationalism associated with Tokugawa self-sufficiency
Furthermore, the disintegration of dynastic China provided
the Japanese with a natural power vacuum within which to
exercise their expansionist ambitions. In essence, Japan's
imperialistic pattern of behavior can be explained in terms
of economic and security needs, a cultural desire not be
dependent on foreigners, a Confucian proclivity for dominant-
subordinate relationships, and a reasonable opportunity for
national aggrandizement.
With China's influence fading and Japan's imperialism
maturing, Tokyo embarked on a strategy aimed at regional
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supremacy. Obviously the decision to seek its goals of
security, prosperity, and status by emulating western
imperialism meant Japan's hegemonic designs would come into
conflict first with China and then with the interests of
the western powers in Northeast Asia.
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In 1874 the Japanese dispatched a punitive expedition
to Taiwan, forcing the Chinese to pay an indemnity for
the death of some Ryukyu Island fishermen shipwrecked there
some years earlier. This expedition was the first major
overseas Japanese military action since Hideyoshi ' s aborted
Korean offensive (1592-1598) and established Japan's claim
to sovereignty over the Ryukyus , an issue of no small moment
in today's current debate between Peking and Tokyo over
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ownership of the East China ocean shelf resources.
Turning north, in 1875 Japan returned Sakhalin to Russia
in exchange for sovereignty over the entire Kuril Island
chain. The Treaty of Saint Petersburg, which forms the
legal basis of Japan's present claim against the Soviet Union
52for possession of the disputed "Northern Territories",
at the time amicably resolved Japan's border issues with
Russia. This freed both nations to pursue their newly
awakened desires for empire building in more lucrative parts
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of Asia. Given the geography of Northeast Asia, it was
only a matter of time before Japanese and Russian imperialism
became mutually exclusive with violent results.
Having secured its northern and southern seaward flanks,
Japan focused on peacefully detaching Korea from the
Chinese tributary system. Using the same tactics as Perry,
the Japanese deployed a naval squadron to Inchon in 1876 and
forced the Korean king to sign a treaty opening peninsula
ports to trade on terms favorable to Japan, while declaring
Korea to be an independent state. For the next two decades
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Tokyo limited itself to political intrigue in Korean politics
as a means of replacing Peking as the suzerain power on
the peninsula. Finally, in 1894, tiring of its rivalry
with China for dominance in Korea and fearful of Russia's
growing interest in an ice-free Korean port as a possible
southern terminus for its planned Trans-Siberian Railway,
Tokyo precipitated the Sino-Japanese War. Japan's devas-
tating victroy contrasted the effects of China and Japan's
differing attitudes about modernization and set in motion
a series of socio-political events that eventually led to
China's revolution in 1911.
In the meantime, the Treaty of Shimonoseki that ended
the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 not only established Japan as
a world power but also as Russia's major competitor for
control of Manchuria and Korea. Besides a large indemnity
and a favorable commercial treaty, which strengthened Japan's
fiscal position, the Treaty of Shimonoseki also forced China
to recognize Korea's independence and to cede Taiwan, the
Pescadores and the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan.
With constructions of the Trans-Siberian Railway under-
way since 1891, Moscow could not allow Japanese possession
of the Liaotung Peninsula go unchallenged, since this stra-
tegic finger of land between the Yellow Sea and the Pohai
Gulf controlled the maritime approaches to southern Manchuria
Because this threatened the accomplishment of Moscow's long
term goal of acquiring an Asian ice-free port connected by
rail with Euope, Russia in concert with France and Germany
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forced Japan to rescind its demand for the Liaotung Penin-
sula shortly after the Shimonoseki agreement was signed.
Infuriated by this Triple Intervention, Tokyo was in no
position, however, to resist the demarche of three western
powers
.
Anxious about the threat posed by Japan's growing econo-
mic and military capacity, and fearing an armed attack to
redress the Triple Intervention, Russia enticed China into
a secrete mutual assistance pact against Japanese aggression.
This Li-Lobanov Treaty of 1896, the historical antecedent
of the 1950 Sino-Soviet alliance, provided the basis for
Russia's increasing influence in Manchuria through the con-
struction of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the eventual
55 . .leasing of the Liaotung Peninsula in 1898. The duplicity
in taking Liaotung after denying it to Japan and the threat
presented to Japanese interests in Korea by Russia's military
occupation of Manchuria's three eastern provinces during the
Boxer Rebellion (1900) made a Russo-Japanese war predictable.
Moscow's determination to have its way in Manchuria was
also becoming alarming to British interests in maintaining
a balance of power in the Far East. The resulting Anglo-
Japanese Treaty of 1902, not unlike Japan's current treaty
arrangement with the United States, provided a security
5 fi
umbrella for Japanese action against Russia. Not only
did the Anglo-Japanese alliance lay the foundation for Japan's
crushing defeat of the Russian Navy at the Battle of
Tsushima (27 May 1905), it also represented Japan ''s first
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modern security treaty with any foreign power and established
the pattern of alliance with Russia's major adversary.
The Treaty of Portsmouth, which was negotiated with
57American assistance in 1905, ended the Russo-Japanese War,
acknowledged Japan's paramount interests in Korea, trans-
ferred the Liaotung lease and the southern portion of the
Manchurian Eastern Railway from Moscow to Tokyo, and ceded
the southern half of Sakhalin back to the Japanese. This
treaty unquestionably certified Japan's credentials as an
expanding world power with an industrial machine to nurture
and an image to maintain.
To be sure, Japan's victories over China and Russia
vindicated the Meiji modernization program, but these
successful wars also awoke Japan to its almost total depen-
dence on foreign supplies for strategic raw materials and
exchange capital. Since 1905, Japanese foreign policy has
concentrated its attention on how best to cope with these
handicaps
.
Internal dissension, leading towards revolution, was
sapping both Chinese and Russian strength as the first
decade of the twentieth century came to a close. Devoid of
competition, Japan annexed Korea in 1910 and in this relaxed
security environment began to concentrate on economic
development and exploitation of its new possessions.
World War I presented Japan with a virtually risk-free
opportunity to consolidate both its security and economic
interests in East Asia. With only minimal participation in
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the war effort as an ally of Great Britain, Japan success-
fully sought as a spoil of war Germany's concession on
China's Tsingtao Peninsula and its island possessions in the
northern Pacific. Additionally, in 1915 with the other
major powers diverted by the fighting in Europe, Tokyo pre-
sented strife-torn China with an opprobrious list of
"Twenty-one Demands", which if acquiesced in would reduce
China to a Japanese protectorate. Because the western powers
were either unable or unwilling to guarantee China's sover-
eignty, President Yuan Shih-kai was forced by a Japanese
ultimatum to submit to certain territorial demands that
. . . 59
assured Japan a commanding position in China. The war
also strengthened Japan economically; products from European
cotton mills and factories were no longer able to reach the
lucrative Asian markets, allowing Japanese industrialists to
take advantage of this situation to supplant these non-Asian
60
suppliers.
Epitomizing the aggressive opportunism of Japanese for-
eign policy in the World War I era was Tokyo's energetic
response for a joint expedition with the U.S. against
sovietized Russia. Seeing Russian resolve depleted by its
costly defeat in central Euroope, the Bolshevik Revolution,
and the ensuing White Russian Civil War, Japan believed the
time was at hand to eliminate this formidable threat to
Japan's interests in Asia. As a result, 72,000 Japanese
troops were deployed to Siberia from 1913 to 1922 with the
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objective of destroying the Russian threat to Japanese
security, extending Japanese economic interests, and preventing
the spread of political influence by the new Russian communist
6
1
regime. Tokyo's ultimate goal of harnessing China and a
non-Bolshevik Siberia to Japanese leadership in East Asia
was, however, frustrated by the collapse of the White Russian
resistance. In view of mounting international criticism and
increasing dissatisfaction at home, Japan terminated its
Siberian adventure in October 19 22.
Militarily secure and economically prosperous after
Versailles, but fearful of being isolated, Japan joined the
great powers at the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 in an
attemtp to stabilize the world through diplomatic action. By
calling for consultations between Japan, Britain, France, and
the U.S. in the event of any East Asian crisis, Washington
and London saw the Four Powers Treaty of 1921 as a graceful
way of ending the potentially embarrassing Anglo-Japanese
Treaty. Since the U.S. had replaced Russia as Japan's most
likely rival in the Pacific, there was considerable anxiety
in the western camp that, in the event of a U.S . -Japanese
confrontation with the Anglo-Japanese alliance still in
effect, London would be forced to support the Japanese against
the Americans. The PFT raises a similar possibility today.
In the event of a Sino-American dispute, Japan might have
difficulty fulfilling its obligations under both the PFT
and its security treaty with the U.S.
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Upon completion of the Washington Conference, which the
Soviet Union was not invited to, growing interest in Siberian
resources and a diplomatic strategy of using Russia to balance
China's resurging strength under Chiang Kai-shek caused the
Japanese to reconsider their strained relationship with
Moscow. As a result, Japan accorded diplomatic recognition
to the Soviet Union in 1925 after two years of protracted
6 2
negotiations. Today the PFT performs a similar function
but the roles of China and Russia are reversed. The 1978
treaty counters growing Soviet power in Asia while creating
a favorable political environment for increased Japanese
access to Chinese raw materials and markets.
A final manifestation of Foreign Minister Shidehara's
"soft policy" of the 1920 's was Japan's agreement in 1928
to the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, which "condemned recourse to




interest in a stable inter-
national order conducive to profitable trading relationships,
Shidehara pursued a policy of conciliation and adjustment —
particularly with China. The crux of Shidehara's policy was
a serious effort to reconcile China's aspirations for moderni-
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zation with Japan's interests. This is essentially the
same motivation behind Japan's decision to sign the PFT.
Throughout the 1920 's Shidehara's internationalist approach
to Japan's problems of maintaining its security and prosperity
were opposed bitterly by the military and certain bureaucratic
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industrialist elements. Baron General Tanaka was the central
figure espousing the concept that Japanese interests could
only be protected by strong, unilateral military expansion.
The world-wide economic depression of 1929, inducing a capital
shortage which sharply curtailed the demand for Japanese
exports, meant Japan no longer had sufficient funds available
to purchase the raw materials needed for its industrial
production. Faced with economic ruination and increasing
challenges to its dominant political position in resource-
rich Manchuria by Chiang's China and Stalin's Russia, Tokyo
turned quickly from its flirtation with a conciliatory
diplomacy to a military strategy for insuring Japanese
self-sufficiency in raw materials and markets. This policy
of imperialism manifested itself in the Japanese invasion
of Manchuria in 1931, full-scale war with China in 1937,
announcement of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere
in 1941 and, ultimately, war with the United States.
Under the growing influence of the ultra-national
militarists, the Japanese ruling oligarchy saw a politically
rejuvenated China, the land power of the Soviet Union, and
the sea power of the United States as major obstacles to
Japan's design for achieving economic self-sufficiency and
military security through hegemony in East Asia. The Japanese
apparently hoped to overcome these obstacles by striking
swiftly against China, neutralizing the Soviets through treaty
arrangements, and convincing the U.S. that Japanese expansion
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was crucial to the survival of Japan but not a threat to
fi fi
American interests in the Pacific.
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Through alliance with Germany, Tokyo was able to take
advantage of Moscow's fears of a two-front war and maneuvered
Stalin into a five-year Neutrality Pact. As a pattern which
remerges with the PFT, it should be noted that Japan was
successful in diplomatically protecting its interests from
Russian interference by allying itself with Moscow's strongest
c o
adversary. Japan's other strategies of quickly subduing
China and avoiding war with the U.S. met with decidedly less
success. A recapitulation of Japan's imperialistic period
shows a foreign policy grounded in the militant pursuit of
security, prosperity, and recognition for Japan. Based on
performance, there seems little doubt that after the catharsis
of the Meiji Restoration Japan's new ruling elite became
bent on reestablishing the Tokugawa sense of independence
on terms amenable to the twentieth century. The ultimate
purpose of this foreign policy was to have China and the
western powers acknowledge Japan as the dominant nation in
the western Pacific. This goal, which the Japanese asso-
ciated with national survival, led to the disasterous results
of World War II, the effects of which continue to shape the
Asian power equation. The U.S. and USSR were established
as the world's only superpowers, China fell to communist
control with an opposition regime set up on Taiwan, Korea
was divided, the Europea powers were shorn of their colonies,
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and Japan renounced the use of force as a viable foreign
policy option.
In terms of the PFT, this era of military expansionism
demonstratively associated Japan's security interests with
the maintenance of friendly regimes in Taiwan and Korea;
the preservation of strong ties with China; and the contain-
ment of Russian influence in Asia. These issues, of course,
form the core of Japan's contemporary security problems and
the PFT can be expected to have an impact on each of them.
More to the point, throughout this period Japan and the Soviet
Union came to view each other with growing mistrust, particu-
larly where China was concerned.
Unquestionably, Japan's decision to sign the PFT and
Moscow's intense opposition to the Sino-Japanese friendship
pact can be explained in terms of contemporary issues, but
the genesis of both Tokyo's and Moscow's policies can be
traced to the 1890 's and the beginning of the Russo-Japanese
rivalry for preeminence in China. The conclusion that Japan's
imperial behavior between 1889 and 1945 has significantly
fashioned the nature of today's triangular relationship
between Tokyo, Peking, and Moscow is unescapable.
The utter defeat in World War II, the American occupation,
and the emergence of the Cold War all worked in unison to
convince the Japanese people that military power was neither
a guarantee of security, prosperity, or status in the nuclear
age. If Japan was to regain its vitality and be readmitted
to the world community as an accepted nation-state, Tokyo 's
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post war leaders realized they would have to rely on the
U.S. for security while they concentrated on economic
development and the promotion of a peaceful world environ-
ment conducive to international trade. Demilitarized by
the Occupation and having (under American tutelage) consti-
tutionally renounced in 194 7 the use of armed force for solving
international disputes, Japan returned to the Shidehara
approach of the 1920 's of insuring security and access to
needed raw materials and markets through a "soft policy"
of avoiding international confrontations.
Given the realities of the Occupation and the bipolar
nature of the international arena, Japan had little choice
in the early 1950 's but to turn to Washington for needed
strategic protection and economic stimulation. With the
anti-Japanese Sino-Soviet alliance having been signed on 14
February 19 5 and the Korean War in progress since June of
that year, Japan formally moved into the American orbit on
8 September 1951, when it signed the San Francisco Peace
Treaty and concluded a bilateral security treaty which committed
the U.S. to defend Japan in the event of attack.
Insulated from the pressures of realpolitik by the
American security alliance and with the commanding strength
of the U.S. and USSR providing only limited opportunities for
substantive foreign policy initiatives, Japan rapidly developed
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a trading company approach to foreign policy. The criteria




contacts for the purpose of maximizing economic well being."
This economic perspective was further abetted by Washington's
containment policy, which saw Japan's economic recovery as
indispensable for protecting Japan from Cold War communist
subversion. As a result, the U.S. fueled the Japanese
economic miracle by relieving Tokyo of a burdensome defense
budget, stimulating the advance of technology, by exchanging
raw materials for finished products on terms favorable to the
Japanese, and by sponsoring Japanese membership in such
international economic organizations such as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) , the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) , and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) . Coupling these factors
with a skilled, industrious labor force and a large supply
of investment capital available from an extraordinary high
rate of savings, Japan's gross national product (GNP) began
to grow at approximately nine percent a year between 1955
and 1960; from 1960 to 1970 it accelerated to twelve percent
per annum and firmly established Japan as the third leading
economy in the world.
With its defense and economic needs being underwritten
by the U.S., Tokyo retreated into a self-imposed Tokugawa
type isolation policy geared towards rebuilding Japan's
industrial capacity. The basic principles of Japanese
post World War II foreign policy can be summarized: avoid
issues which might weaken the American commitment to Japan,
broaden economic relations with other states while minimizing
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political interactions, and quietly encourage a peaceful
world order supportive of free trade. By defining its
national interests throughout the bipolar era in terms of
continued economic growth, Japan's foreign policy became
progressively more passive and couched in pragmatic economics
with little regard for the broader political implications of
72
such behavior. Furthermore, Japan's "economic miracle"
tended to confirm for the Japanese people the appropriate-
ness of separating economics from foreign affairs and closely
associated an attitude of international passivity with
Japan's continuing postwar boom.
Japan's diplomatic interaction with both the People's
Republic of China and the Soviet Union prior to the 1970 's
clearly demonstrates Tokyo's economically driven desire to
avoid an activist foreign policy. Neither the PRC nor the
USSR signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 and at the
time this seemed of little consequence, since Japan's Prime
Minister Yoshida had no identifiable foreign policy other
than increasingly integrating Japan's security and economic
interests with those of the U.S. This lack of formal con-
tact with either Peking or Moscow tended to reenforce Tokyo's
close bipolar identification with Washington and further
reduce Japan's foreign policy options.
The intimacy of Japanese-American relations was brought
into focus by the Yoshida Letter of 24 December 1951, which
pledged Japanese recognition of Chian Kai-shek's Nationalist
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regime and committed Japan to the American policy of con-
73tainmg the PRC. The Yoshida letter remained the corner-
stone of Japan's China policy until the Chou-Tanaka
communique of 1972,
By keeping economics separate from politics Japan was,
however, able to enter into some lucrative non-official
74trade agreements with the PRC as early as June 1952.
As late as 196 9, America's continued domination of Japan's
China policy was reflected in the Sato-Nixon communique of
21 November, To obtain the return of administrative control
over Okinawa, the Japanese Prime Minister acknowledged in
this communique the importance of Korea for the security
of Japan. This essentially was a reaffirmation by both
Washington and Tokyo of the containment policy aimed at Peking.
As for the Soviet Union, Japanese policy, encouraged by
the previous century of Russo-Japanese competition in Asia
and the security pact with the U.S., remained through the
1950 *s and 1960 's in consonance with Washington's position.
The only major policy initiative pursued by the Japanese
was the 19 October 1956 joint declaration officially ending
World War II hostilities with the Soviet Union and reestab-
lishing regular diplomatic relations. Though not enthusias-
tically welcomed by the Eisenhower administration, this
settlement extracted Soviet acceptance of the Japanese
security arrangement with the U.S. As with China, Japan's
official support for Washington's containment policies did
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not prevent Tokyo from seeking improved economic relations
with Moscow in the 1960 r s.
To summarize, Japan adapted well to the realities of the
bipolar era, using the American security shield to remain
aloof from international imbroglios while also relying on
American economic strength to prevent any serious disruption
in the world economic order important to Japanese trade and
recovery. As a defacto American satellite, however, the
natural evolution of Japan's diplomatic relations with the
Soviet Union and particularly China were arrested. This
passive, American encouraged neo-isolationist , approach
towards its most important neighbors set the stage for Japan's
major policy dilemmas of the 1970 's. Being Asia's only
industrial power, Japan represented both a threat and an
opportunity to Moscow and Peking, but as the 197 *s opened
Japan was confused about how to respond to the new stimuli
associated with multipolarity . The decision to conclude
the PFT would indicate that Japan's confusion is beginning
to abate.
As the 1970 's opened, America's superiority in defense
and economic spheres was diminishing. The announcement of
75the Nixon Doctrine in 1969, the economic shocks of 1971,
followed in rapid succession by Nixon's trip to China, the
U.S. military withdrawal from Vietnam in 1972, and the Arab
oil embargo of 1973, all served as warnings to the Japanese
that they would have to modify their dependence on the U.S. in
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order to insure Japan's continuing security and prosperity.
In short, Washington's response to multipolarity caused
Japan to question the firmness of the American commitment
"76
to Japan.
As in the early days of the imperialistic period, Japan
began to see the fragility of its security and economic
miracles. It became apparent that, because of Japan's
growing international influence and expanding economic needs
,
the minimalistic foreign policy of a trading company was
no longer acceptable. Ironically, the very success of
Japan's "economics-first policies" was the cause of their
demise. As an international economic power, Japan could no
longer be content with merely adapting to world economic
trends; instead, continued prosperity demanded that Japan
contribute directly to the smooth functioning of international
77trade and commerce. Japan's economic requirements for
raw materials and markets became so crucial to the Japanese
state of well being that economic arrangements with suppliers
and buyers had to be reenforced by political accords.
With the U.S. seeking accommodation with China and the
Soviet Union, Japan's fears of being isolated politically
and economically grew to the point where Tokyo for its own
self-protection was forced to augment its relationship with
the U.S. by seeking closer ties with Peking and Moscow.
Realizing that a more activist foreign policy would be
counter-productive to its goals of shaping a world framework
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for security and prosperity if it resulted in Japan being
dragged into the Sino-Soviet conflict, Tokyo contemplated
a policy of "equi-distance.
"
Trying to put aside past political differences and
establish firm economic ties, Prime Minister Tanaka traveled
to Peking in September 1972 to normalize relations, and to
Moscow in October 1973. At each summit the question of a
bilateral peace treaty between Japan and the host country
was discussed. Such treaties were considered necessary by
all concerned to close the books on World War II, for
regenerating diplomatic ties damaged by Cold War animosities,
and for symbolizing Japan's independence from the U.S. The
complex unfolding of events since 1972 that blocked the
conclusion of a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty and led to
Foreign Minister Sonoda's initialing the PFT are manifesta-
tions of Japan's uneasiness about transitioning to a more
involved foreign policy.
Historically, Japan has steadfastly pursued the goals
of security, prosperity, and status. The strategy for
achieving these goals has, however, shifted dramatically
with changes in Japan's environment and relative power. In
the short time since the Meiji Restoration these adjustments
have transformed Japan from an isolated self-sufficient
agrarian island nation into a cosmopolitan, interdependent
modern industrial state. Throughout this transition, Japan's
ruling elite linked security, prosperity, and status with
the successful emulation of the western model of industrialization
56

Industry's constant requirement for raw materials and
markets has in turn forced Tokyo to deal with the dichotomy
of foreign dependency and cultural insularity. From 1868 to
1945, with the brief exception of the 1920 's, Japan relied
on power politics and military intervention to procure its
industrial needs; from 1945 until 1971 Japan rejected force,
avoided diplomatic polemics, and turned to the United States
to guarantee its access to raw materials and markets. In
each period, the Japanese leadership accurately assessed
the constellation of challenges threatening the achievement
of Japan's national goals and responded with efficient prag-
matism. Despite the obvious philosophical differences
between Japan's pre-and post-World War II policies, it is
significant that both sought to relieve Japan's dependency
by keeping political commitments to a minimum. This should
not have been totally unexpected phenomenon, given Japan's
cultural context.
The PFT as a political accord, entered into by Japan
"for the purpose of solidifying and developing relations
79
of peace and friendship" with China, represents a major
departure from Tokyo's past philosophy of minimizing politi-
cal commitments to maximize economic flexibility. The
events of the 1970 's have apparently shown the Japanese
that closer bilateral political linkages with potential
economic partners are required in today's environment of
dwindling resources and market protectionism. In tune with
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Japan's historical development, the PFT is an accommodation
to the challenges that interdependency and multipolarity
pose to the Japanese attainment of security, prosperity, and
status.
Because Japan negotiated the PFT without the overt
support of the U.S., and in the face of strenuous Soviet
opposition, there can be little question that Japanese
foreign policy is becoming more independently oriented.
More subtly, the PFT may also mean that after a hundred
years, Japan's almost complete dependence on foreign
suppliers and buyers is modifying the Japanese cultural
proclivity towards isolation. As the American-Japanese
Treaty of 1858, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, the
Triparte pact of 1940, and the U. S . -Japanese Security
Alliance of 1952 were all harbingers of significant changes
in Japanese foreign policy, so might the case be with the
Peace and Friednship Treaty of 1978.
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IV. THE PFT AS A FUNCTION OF THE JAPANESE
DECISION MAKING PROCESS
Before examining the impact of Tokyo's new ties with
Peking on the achievement of Japan's traditional interests
in security, prosperity, and status, the value of the PFT
for illuminating the mechanics of Japanese foreign policy
decisions should not be overlooked. As a major foreign
policy issue, Prime Minister Fukuda's decision in March 1978
80
to press for the immediate conclusion of the PFT, reflects
a national consensus that took six years to build due to the
cumbersome nature of Japanese politics. That this much time
was required, even after both sides had agreed in the
Chou-Tanaka communique of 1972 "to hold negotiations aimed
at the conclusion of a treaty of peace and friendship",
supports the frequent observations that Japanese foreign




A. THE PFT AS AN EXAMPLE OF CONSENSUS BUILDING
Under its parliamentary system, the formal responsibility
for policy determinations rests with the Japanese Diet;
but in actuality, before the Diet acts on any issue a clear
consensus must exist within the ruling Liberal Democratic
Party, (LDP) which is also acceptable to the government's
bureaucracy, the business community, the opposition parties,
and public opinion. Because the Japanese decision making
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process is premised on a consensus model, each of these
elements has a potential veto on any major policy question.
Tokyo's long delayed decision to conclude the PFT shows the
unique political blending of feudal factionalism and western
style parliamentarianism in post World War II Japanese
politics. Needless to say, such traits are conducive to
8 2
neither decisive leadership nor rapid decision making.
In the case of the PFT, most observers agree, the primary
obstacle to forming a consensus was the right-wing pro-
8 3Taiwan lobby within the LDP. Japan's foreign ministry
experts, the business community, the opposition parties
(with the exception of the pro-Moscow Japanese Communist
Party) , and the average Japanese citizen, each to varying
84degrees, favored signing the PFT. This meant the domestic
debate over whether or not to seek closer relations with
PRC at the expense of Taiwan and the Soviet Union was con-
fined to LDP intra-party politics. Since May 1974, when
Tokyo and Peking began preliminary negotiations, LDP Hawks
have opposed the PFT because of the serious impact it might
have on Japan's lucrative economic ties with Taiwan and the
antagonizing effect the anti-hegemony clause could have on
Japanese-Soviet relations. China's territorial claim to the
Senkakus and Peking's failure to abrogate its anti -Japan
alliance of 1950 with Moscow were other high visibility
issues used by LDP opponents of the treaty. Furthermore,
the PFT was also a political football amongst LDP faction
leaders for control of the party and thus the government.
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After replacing Miki as Prime Minister in later 1976
Fukuda consistently sought to improve relations with China,
but early attempts to initiate negotiations for a peace
and friendship treaty in January and May of 1977 were aborted
due to disagreements within the LDP. Cabinet Secretary
Sonoda's attempts in early 1977 to convey to the Chinese
leadership the enthusiasm of the new Fukuda government for
the PFT by characterizing former Foreign Minister Miyazawa's
"Four Points" for Japanese acceptance of the Chinese anti-
hegemony clause as private opinion and not an official
negotiating position. The Miki faction protested this inter-
pretation through the bureaucracy of the Foreign Ministry
and Sonoda was forced to retreat. Since Miyazawa's Four
Points (which stipulated that the anti-hegemony clause was
not to be directed at any third country; that it was not
restricted to the Asian-Pacific region; that it would not
entail joint Sino-Japanese action; and that it must be com-
patible with the United Nation's Charter) were unacceptable
to Peking, these treaty negotiations were broken off because
the LDP could not reach a consensus on the anti-hegemony
issue.
In May 19 77, Fukuda made another attempt to get PFT
negotiations underway by asking Lower House Speaker Hori
(who was scheduled to visit Peking) to take a personal
message to Hua Kuo-feng that Japan was ready to sign a
8 5
treaty as soon as possible. Party hawks and elders, as
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well as those in the bureaucracy and business community
counseling prudence, forced Fukuda, by withholding their
consensual approval, to back off from his optimistic pre-
dictions about expediting the conclusion of the PFT. At
a press conference on 10 June 1977, Fukuda noted that, being
preoccupied with many important political events since
assuming office, he had not had sufficient time to consider
the contents of the treaty or a realistic schedule for
8 6
negotiations with the PRC. Fukuda was admitting it would
take time to fabricate at least a passive consensus (i.e.,
one where there are at least no strenuous objectors) amongst
the LDP factions on the general question of closer relations




Sensing that the successful conclusion of the PFT would
boost his sagging political stock, which was being driven
down by Japan's faltering domestic economy and growing
international criticism of Tokyo's protectionist trade and
currency practices, Prime Minister Fukuda began defusing
LDP opposition to the PFT in order to set the stage for
reopening bilateral negotiations with Peking. In December
1977, he drastically reshuffled his cabinet, primarily to
take a fresh look at Japan's economic difficulties with
the U.S., but he also appointed Cabinet Secretary and Sino-
phile Sonoda as Foreign Minister. A vocal advocate, for the
PFT, as well as a staunch Fukuda faction member, Sonoda was
an ideal choice to run interference for the treaty. He
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seemed to be the type of Foreign Minister who would nego-
tiate the treaty, take the flak, and give the credit to the
. . 88
Prime Minister.
During a policy speech on 21 January 1978. Fukuda told
the Diet that improved relations with China were linked with
89the prompt conclusion of the PFT. On 14 February, Japan's
ambassador to Peking, Shoji Sato met with Chinese Vice
Foreign Minister Han Nien-lung to begin a series of dis-
90
cussions about reopening negotiations on the PFT. Later,
in February Japan concluded an eight year $20 billion trade
agreement with the PRC, the timing of which may have been
designed to use the solvent of economics on LDP hardline
. . 91
opposition to the PFT. Clearly, Fukuda was gradually
building momentum within the LDP that would allow him finally
to sign the PFT and collect the political dividends asso-
ciated with such a highly visible act of statesmanship.
This momentum was, however, temporarily sidetracked by
the sudden appearance on the evening of 12-13 April 197 8
of 100 plus Chinese fishing boats off the Senakaku Islands.
Speculation abounded over Peking's motives for so obtusely
raising the question of sovereignty over these uninhabited
islets at a time when it appeared Japan was on the verge
of scrapping its equidistant strategy in favor of closer
ties with China. Theories ran the gamut from Chinese impatience
over Japanese procrastination about signing the PFT to local
Chinese radical elements trying to embarrass Vice Premier Ten
Hsiao-ping and his pragmatic non-ideological approach to
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92foreign policy. Regardless, the Fukuda government sought
to minimize any advantage anti-treaty groups within the
LDP might derive from this incident by quickly accepting the
lame but official explanation that the fishing boats had
93intruded "accidentally" into the Senkaku area.
In fact, Sonoda took advantage of the Senkaku incident
to chastize hawkish LDP members for endangering Japan's
sovereignty over the islands by inferring that the Chinese
action was a protest against those party elements blocking
94 . .
the prompt conclusion of the PFT. The Foreign Minister
used the Senkaku incident to weaken the position of the
LDP anti-treaty forces by immediately agreeing with China
to disassociate the question of ownership of the Senkakus
from any negotiations on the PFT and by suggesting that a
friendly China was less likely to challenge Japan's claims
95
to these islands than a hostile China.
With Tokyo and Peking agreeing that the territorial
dispute over the Senkakus was peripheral to the more
important issue of the PFT, the only obstacles to an LDP
consensus on commencing serious negotiations with China were
doubts about Peking's reluctance to officially terminate the
anti-Japanese Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950 and Peking's
insistence on the inclusion of an unqualified anti-hegemony
clause. Since the Sino-Soviet treaty was due to expire in
April of 1980 with little chance of extension, the Fukuda
regime apparently encountered little difficulty in gaining




that the Sino-Soviet pact was "virtually extinct."
Concurrently, right-wing LDP resistance to an anti -hegemony
clause wording similar to that used in the Chou-Tanaka
communique was being eroded by worsening Japanese-Soviet
relations, reflected by Moscow's ominous warnings to Tokyo
about the serious implications of concluding the PFT,
Russian restrictions on Japanese fishing activity, and Soviet
military muscle flexing in the vicinity of Etorofu during
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June 1978.
Furthermore, Hanoi's growing identification as a Soviet
surrogate with a commensurate increase in tensions along the
Sino-Vietnamese border, caused Peking to signal its willing-
ness to Tokyo that China was ready to be more flexible on
the anti-hegemony clause issue to get Japanese agreement on
9 8
a treaty to counterbalance Moscow's increasing efforts to
encircle the PRC.
Anti-PRC LDP members were also appeased somewhat in
June 1978 by the House of Councillors' passage of the Japan-
South Korea Continental Shelf Joint Development Agreement,
which delimits offshore drilling rights in the East China
Sea and had been opposed by Peking on the grounds that it
99infringed on China's seabed rights in this area. Fukuda
was also representing President Carter's wish for "success"
conveyed during their May summit as American support for
the PFT.
In this pro-treaty atmosphere the LDP leadership on
23 June sanctioned Fukuda ' s third porposal for renewing
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negotiations with China on the conclusion of a peace and
friendship treaty.
.
After some short delays associated
with the Bonn economic summit and the intensification of
tensions along the Sino-Vietnamese border, China and Japan
ended a three-year hiatus on 21 July 1978 when PFT nego-
tiations recommenced in Peking.
The only major issue to be resolved in these negotiations
was the anti-hegemony clause. Consequently, the Peking
sessions came to fruition quickly on 12 August, when China
accepted Japan's position that the anti-hegemony clause,
which seemed targeted directly at the Soviet Union, be
softened with a third country caveat stating that "the
present treaty shall not affect the position of either con-
102tracting party regarding its relations with third countries."
Knowing in advance that this third country clause would not
103placate Soviet animosity towards the PFT, its more likely
purpose was to at least passively reconcile hawkish LDP
members who, for three years, had argued against inclusion
104
of the anti-hegemony clause in the treaty.
Fukuda's artful orchestration of PFT issues to gain the
grudging agreement of the LDP right is a textbook demon-
stration of the rigors of Japanese consensus politics. The
political maneuvering of the Prime Minister not only pro-
vides an insight into the dynamics of consensus building,
it also exposes an interesting linkage between Japanese
foreign policy decisions and domestic politics. Specifically,
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the domestic machinations associated with the conclusion
of the PFT support the generalization that foreign policy
issues are a convenient instrument for LDP factions to use
in their competition for party ascendancy and control of
the government. " The reason for this is the domination
of Japanese electoral politics by local bread and butter
issues; consequently, Japanese Dietmen have greater latitude
of action on foreign policy questions than on domestic
issues such as employment and social welfare programs,
10 6
which are uppermost in the Japanese voter's mind.
B. THE PFT AND THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JAPANESE
DOMESTIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY
From the outset there has been speculation that Fukuda '
s
interest in the PFT was motivated by considerations of LDP
politics and by the treaty's potential value for prolonging
his own premiership. As early as March 1978, one veteran
observer of Japanese politics reported that "the LDP itself
is beginning to feel it needs the treaty for reasons of
popularity. And there is a feeling that only Fukuda can
prevail over LDP opponents to get the treaty, precisely
107because he is identified with the hawks and elders."
After the Senkakus incident, however, opposing faction
leaders sensed that Fukuda ' s strong position in favor of the
PFT might be a political liability that they could use to
frustrate his plan to ride the treaty to a second term as
Prime Minister. By May of 1978, "it [was] impossible to
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discuss the China-Japan treaty without hearing about the
ambitions of Fukuda ' s rivals in the LDP, particularly
10 8Masayoshi Ohira and Yasuhiro Nakasone."
Nakasone, former Defense Agency Director and Chairman
of the LDP Executive Board known for his conservative
polemics, quickly branded any friendship treaty with China
109that did not resolve the status of the Senkakus as a fraud.
Conversely, Ohira, who was Secretary General of the LDP under
Fukuda and who by prior arrangement was the Prime Minister's
heir apparent, commented that "the China treaty is blown out
of all proportion." Ohira was Tanaka * s Foreign Minister
in 1972, when relations with China were normalized, so he
favored the signing of the PFT as the capstone to the Chou-
Tanaka communique, but he did not want Fukuda transforming
the PFT into a political advantage that would prevent his
accession to the premiership.
Despite their philosophical differences over closer
relations with China, both Nakasone and Ohira shared a con-
cern that the momentum Fukuda had achieved with the August
signing of the PFT might terminate any chance they had for
unseating him in the December elections for LDP party
president. Ohira ' s stunning victory over Fukuda in these
party elections suggests that all of the candidates may
have overestimated the electoral value of the PFT.
Examining Japan's decision to conclude the PFT highlights
both the consenual nature of Japanese politics and the strong
influence LDP factional politics can have on substantive
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foreign policy matters. The unfolding of the PFT decision
testifies to how easily one segment of Japan's consensus
forming coterie, in this case the right-wing of the LDP,
can hamstring governmental action by simply withholding its
approval. The new treaty also emphasizes the Prime Minister's
function as a formulator of consensus rather than a decisive
policy maker.
Prime Minister's Fukuda ' s dependence on the PFT to
compensate for domestic political liabilities, such as the
faltering economy and the violence associated with the opening
of Narita Airport, proved to be misplaced. That an incumbent
Prime Minister could not translate the public euphoria over
the PFT and the prestige of Teng ' s October visit to Tokyo
into an electoral victory documented the overwhelming
influence domestic issues have on Japanese politics.
None of these phenomena are new to students of Japanese
politics, so that while the PFT may represent a new, more
independent, foreign policy for Japan, the treaty is not a
precursor of change in the mechanics of Japanese decision
making. Consequently, nations dealing with Japan for the
foreseeable future must be prepared to allow the Japanese
leadership sufficient time and maneuvering room to build a
consensus before any significant change in foreign policy
can be realistically expected.
69

V. THE IMPACT OF THE PFT ON CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES IN JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY
The preceding historical analysis discussed the impact
of Japan's cultural context and decision making process on
Japanese foreign policy formation. It showed that geo-
graphic location, cultural homogeneity, pragmatic adapta-
bility, modernization, and consensus politics have historically
played key roles in shaping Japanese foreign policy and can
be related to Japan's more recent journey towards the con-
clusion of the PFT.
Because cultural context and the decision making process
are independent variables not susceptible to precipitous
change, they define the broad framework within which current
Japanese national interests must fall. Any qualitative
assessment of the PFT's potential impact on Japan's relations
with China, the Soviet Union, and the United States must
take cognizance of these boundaries. Certainly, it would
be unrealistic to expect the PFT to: significantly change
the sense of security or fear of isolation arising from
Japan's insular geography; to dampen the Japanese perception
of uniqueness based on ethno-linguistic homogeneity; to
undo Japan's traditional affinity for China and historical
suspicions of Russia; or to modify the passive nature of
Japan's decision making by consensus. Intuitively, it
appears that the PFT by itself will not immediately alter
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the fundamental nature of Tokyo's present relations with
Peking, Moscow, or Washington.
Being more a product than a modifier of the interaction
between Japan's cultural context and political process, the
search for the PFT's broadest impact should focus on the
current problematic issues of Japanese foreign policy, which
generically continue to be security, prosperity, and influ-
ence. According to an official policy statement by the
Japanese Foreign Ministry "the ultimate goal of Japan's
diplomacy is to assure the security and growth of Japan and
to contribute to the peace and progress of the international
112
community." The following discussion will attempt to
discern how the PFT specifically affects Japan's security,
economic, and political relations with China, the Soviet
Union, and the United States.
A. THE PFT'S IMPACT ON JAPANESE SECURITY RELATIONS
Major ground wars in Korea and Vietnam have already been
fought since World War II, and today potentially explosive
situations exist on the Sino-Soviet border, along Korea's
38th parallel, in the waters of the East China Sea, and in
the jungles of Southeast Asia. Japan has to date success-
fully pursued a minimalist national defense policy driven
by economic logic, underwritten by the U.S., and eschewing
force. This approach to national security was, however,
formulated in the cauldron of Cold War bipolarity, where
security issues for Japan were relatively simplistic.
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Since the early 19 50 's, when Sino-Soviet conventional
aggression posed the only credible threat to Japan's peace
and prosperity, Tokyo's security problems have been multi-
plied factorially by the Soviet attainment of nuclear
parity with the U.S., the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine,
the growing scarcity of raw materials, the rapid political
and economic developments taking place in Southeast Asia,
and the success of Japan's own economic policies; but the
erosion of the 1950 Sino-Soviet allinace has altered the
Japanese security calculus more than any other event. While
the direct threat of aggression against the home islands is
now considerably reduced, the threat to Asian stability posed
by the Soviet-American rivalry has been augmented by the
volatile polemics associated with the deterioration of Sino-
Soviet relations.
American military strength in Asia remains the corner-
stone of Japan's current "omnidirectional" foreign policy
for maintianing a peaceful equilibrium in the region but the
security options available to Tokyo are no longer as straight
forward as they once were. Given the growing number of
variables affecting Asian stability, which remains Japan's
basic security goal, a key question becomes how the PFT's
call for friendlier relations between Tokyo and Peking will
affect the future development of Japan's security policy
towards China, the Soviet Union and the U.S.
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1. Sino-Japanese Security Relations
By virtue of its geographical and cultural proximity,
Japan's foreign policy has historically fixated on China.
Since the Meiji Restoration, security considerations have
played a dominant role in this fixation. From the Sino-
Japanese War (1894-1895) to World War II, Japan's security
policy towards China was characterized by the harsh employ-
ment of military superiority to weaken China and force
Peking's capitulation to Japan's broader international and
economic interests. During the Cold War from 1949 to 1971,
Japan's security relations with China merely echoed Washing-
ton's containment policy. After President Nixon's surprising
1972 visit to China, Japan moved quickly and independently
to make diplomatic amends for its past abuses of China,
with the Chou-Tanaka communique setting forth new guidelines
for the development of Sino-Japanese relations.
Even though the PFT text makes no direct reference to
Sino-Japanese security issues, security continues to be a
crucial determinant of Sino-Japanese relations. Japan's
resistance to the anti-hegemony clause and the fact it took
nearly six years to negotiate the PFT can be attributed to
Japan's sensitivities about the treaty's impact on Japan's
overall security posture, particularly the possibility that
closer ties with China might embroil Tokyo in the Sino-Soviet
dispute.
Most students of security questions in East Asis do
not see China and Japan as representing a formidable military
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threat to each other's homelands. Nonetheless, Japan and
China do have differing if not conflicting interests in
East Asia that could be potentially disruptive to regional
stability. Since 1972 Tokyo and Peking have deemphasized
points of friction in Southeast Asia, the Senkaku Islands,
the ocean resources of the East China Sea, Korea and, of
course, Taiwan in order to improve the overall tenor of
Sino-Japanese relations. The mutual deferment of these
volatile issues was necessary to bring the PFT to completion,
and now that the treaty is signed Japan is hopeful that it
will engender an atmosphere of political and economic
cooperation that will ameliorate Sino-Japanese security
differences.
In Southeast Asia, China has shown little interest
113in challenging Japanese economic dominance, but because
the region is a traditional Chinese buffer zone Peking has
expressed some low keyed anxiety about the possibility of
Tokyo's eventually translating its regional financial strength
114into political influence. Japan, for its part has worried
about Chinese- fomented "wars of liberation" that might give
the Chinese more leverage in Southeast Asian capitals and
threaten Japanese investments. Through closer bilateral
relations, the PFT protects Japanese economic interests in
this area by implicitly assuring Peking that Japan's regional
concerns are with economic access to raw materials and markets,
not with threatening China's security. As long as China
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perceives Japan to be sincere about its economic motives,
the PFT will be an effective lubricant to Sino-Japanese
friction in Southeast Asia. By establishing a political
framework for averting serious economic competition between
China and Japan, the treaty should also dampen the momentum
for a destabilizing trade war in Southeast Asia that could
115develop from China's present push for rapid industrialization.
This straightforward analysis of how the PFT should
affect Japanese security interests in Southeast Asia is,
however, complicated by the Peace and Friendship Treaty that
Vietnam concluded with the Soviet Union on 3 November 1978.
By bringing the Sino-Soviet dispute to Indochina, this de
116
facto military agreement between Hanoi and Moscow cancels
out a good deal of the soothing effects of the PFT in South-
east Asia for Japan. Having tilted towards Peking, Tokyo
must now delicately reassess its expanding economic ties
with Hanoi. Besides its own domestic economic interests,
Japan must consider whether a continuation of its economic
links with Vietnam will offend China or if the curtailment
of financial assistance for Vietnamese development projects
will exacerbate anti-Japanese sentiments in the Kremlin.
With military tensions persisting along the Chinese-Vietnamese
border after the demise of Cambodia, and Hanoi's alliance
with Moscow, the PFT limits Japanese options for dealing with
the new security situation in Southeast Asia. Most ominously,
the PFT could force Japan eventually into a choice between
foregoing all its investments in Southeast Asia, as well as
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the other benefits accruing from cordial relations with
China, or supporting Peking's anti-Vietnamese policy. In
short, the PFT makes it expensive, if not difficult, for
Japan to feint neutrality towards Peking and Moscow's esca-
118lating competition for influence in Southeast Asia.
The Senkaku Islands are the only unresolved terri-
torial dispute extant between China and Japan. Sovereignty
over these five uninhabited islands northeast of Taiwan
is difficult to determine and potentially explosive because
their possession could govern the allocation of seabed rights
in the East China Sea, between Japan and China. Even though
the Chinese and Japanese have prepared comprehensive legal
119briefs to bolster their claims, there is little chance
of international jurisprudence solving this, dispute because
of the national prestige associated with territorial
claims, the importance of oil to both economics, and the
distraction of Taiwan's assertion of sovereignty.
Realizing the contentious nature of these issues,
both sides decided after the Chou-Tanaka summit to lay aside
the question of ownership of the Senkakus so that it would
not interfere with the improvement of relations. Despite
a pressing need to develop indigenous energy sources, Japan
suspended geological survey operations in the area and
China muted its sovereignty claims to avoid precipitating
a crisis. Clearly, Cina and Japan were both hopeful that
improving political and economic relations would lead to
a workable compromise on the Senkakus issue.
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On this basis, Peking and Tokyo moved quickly to
defuse the April 1978 Senkaku incident so that it would not
derail the progress being made towards meaningful PFT nego-
tiations. Believing the ultimate solution to this terri-
torial question depended on the larger issue of solidifying
Sino-Japanese ties, the Fukuda government accepted uncritically
the Chinese explanation that its intrusion was accidental.
With the conclusion of the PFT on 12 August 1978 the Senkaku
question was again anesthetized by Teng ' s reported comment
that Japan's administrative control over the island should
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remain frozen for two or three decades. Eventually, the
PFT should make it easier for Japan's need for oil and
China's lack offshore technology to permanently resolve
their territorial rights in the Senkakus . In the mean time,
the current policy of agreeing to disagree, which allows
either China or Japan to express its displeasure with the
other by challenging its claims to the Senkakus is potentially
unstable and might restrain the Japanese desire to develo-
seabed resources in the East China Sea.
Strategic location, plus fish and petroleum resources,
make the East China valuable to both Tokyo and Peking, who
differ over how these resources should be shared. In
general, China has consistently supported law of the sea
principles that would protect its options for maximizing its
jurisdiction over the resources of the East China Sea. Peking
endorses the idea of exclusive coastal state control over a
200-mile economic zone and asserts that China's continental
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shelf rights, by virtue of the natural prolongation prece-
dent established by the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases , extend beyond 200 miles, all the way to the Okinawa
u 121Trough.
As a major fishing and maritime nation, Japan's
rights are not served by legal principles which extend a
coastal state's seaward jurisdiction. Japan rejects the
natural prolongation concept, contending instead that all
resource rights in the East China Sea should be allocated
on the basis of the median line solution called for by the
1221958 Geneva Continental Shelf Convention. For this
reason, sovereignty over the Senkaku's is particularly
important to Japan, since ownership of these islands would
push the base points for a Sino-Japanese median line as far
to the west as possible, thereby giving Japan a larger share
of the East China Sea's oceanic resources.
Coupling the importance of fish and petroleum to
the economies of both Japan and China with the political
implications of Taiwan and both Korea's claims, the potential
for conflict over economic jurisdictional matters in the
East China Sea presents a considerable danger to regional
stability. This danger was cooled by the improving Sino-
Japanese relations that led to the PFT.
To get Japanese accession to the PFT, which Peking
saw as crucial to containing Soviet influence in East Asia,
China demonstrated a willingness to be flexible on the Senkaku
sovereignty question, softened its critism of Japan's decision
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to engage in joint continental shelf development projects
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with South Korea, and inferred a readiness to compromise
on its natural prolongation claims to jurisdiction over most
of the East China Sea's continental shelf.
In this improving atmosphere, the Japanese are
becoming more concerned about access to the fishery and
oil resources of the East China Sea than in establishing
their jurisdictional rights in the basin. Reflecting this
emerging attitude about offshore resources, Saburo Okita,
the director of the Japanese Overseas Cooperation Fund,
points out
We used to feel more strongly
about controlling our sources
of oil than we do now after
OPEC. Now getting the oil
seems more important to us
than developing it ourselves.
...the main things is the
supply of oil. It all right with
us if China develops it. ^-^4
Having cautiously measured for six years the poten-
tial benefits of pressing its own claims in the East China
Sea, the Japanese have apparently concluded that they are
likely to get a larger share of the offshore resources
through cooperation rather than confrontation with the Chinese
Tokyo probably agreed to the PFT, optimistic that it would
create an economic and political rubric useful for assuring
the flow of offshore resources, particularly oil, to Japan.
Lacking Japan's sophisticated offshore technology, the
Chinese have justified this optimism by quickly following
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the PFT with invitations for extensive Japanese partici-
pation in the joint development of offshore oil fields in
the Chukiang River estuary, the Pohai Gulf, and the Yellow
125
Sea. The Chinese have also indicated to the Japanese
since the signing of the PFT that they are prepared to
renew the 1975 Japan-China fisheries agreement with minimal
changes and without declaring a 200-mile fishing zone.
Superficially, China's and Japan's unilateral claims
to ocean resources in the East China Sea on the mutually
exclusive terms of natural prolongation and a median line
solution, respectively, are abrasions that if left untreated
could infect the overall health of Sino-Japanese relations.
Strengthened Sino-Japanese ties make it unlikely that Peking
and Tokyo will not be able to resolve the allocation of
ocean resources between them on the basis of common interests.
It should be remembered, however, that China and Japan agreed
only to defer settling the complex issues associated with
their conflicting jurisdictional claims in the East China
Sea in order to induce the spirit of cooperation needed to
conclude the PFT. While closer ties should facilitate a
resolution on fishing and offshore drilling rights now that
the PFT is signed and ratified, a breakdown in Sino-Japanese
relations could be signaled by either party growing intransi-
gent about protecting its own ocean resources from infringement.
Perhaps even more detrimental to Japan's security
interests than diplomatic bickering between Tokyo and Peking
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over law of the sea issues would be a Chinese anti-Soviet
gambit to restrict the fishing, maritime, and naval opera-
tions of non-littoral states in the East China Sea by
declaring it a semi-enclosed international body of water.
China could justify such an action as being in accordance
with Article 129 of the pending Third United Nations Law
of the Sea Conference Revised Single Negotiating Text as
necessary to protect the "legitimate" economic and security
interests of the coastal states. The Soviets, of course,
are unlikely to countenance any inferred limitations on
naval access to the East China Sea, since there is no
alternative route for Russian naval units deploying to or
from Vladivostok via the Tsushima Straits, the Sea of
Japan's only year-round portal. If the Chinese do attempt
by resort to international law to restrict the Soviet
Pacific Fleet's access to the East China Sea, then Japan's
participation in offshore development projects made possible
by the PFT could result in Soviet counter pressures against
Japanese fishing boats, oil rigs, etc. This might induce
Tokyo to lobby for Chinese policies that would not impede
Soviet naval mobility.
Stated briefly, the PFT reduces the likelihood of
Japan being drawn into a conflict with China over economic
rights in the East China Sea, a plus for Japanese economic
and security interests. In the negative ledger, Moscow might
view the resolution of complex jurisdictional issues in the
East China Sea between Japan and China as prejudicial to
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Soviet economic and security interests in Northeast Asia,
which would aggravate Soviet-Japanese relations even further.
The Korean peninsula has historically been a con-
fluence point for Japanese and Chinese security interests.
Going back to the Mongol attempts to invade Japan, the
peninsula has figured prominently in many East Asian mili-
tary conflicts. In 1592 Hideyoshi embarked on his abortive
campaign to conquer China by way of Korea; after the Meiji
Restoration the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Russo-
Japanese War (1904-1905) were fought, in part, to establish
Tokyo's mastery over Korea; the Japanese invasion of Manchuria
in 19 31 was launched from Korea. China's assistance to
Kim Il-sung during and after the Korean War (1950-1953) also
shows that the peninsula remains as strategically important
to the Chinese Politburo as it was to the Chinese Emperor.
Because history supports the proposition that Korea is simul-
taneously an invasion corridor to China and a "dagger" pointed
at Japan, both Tokyo and Peking have similar, but mutually
exclusive, traditional security interests in preventing a
hostile regime from controlling Korea.
Divided along the 38th parallel after the 1953
armistice, with Pyongyang and Seoul still glaring at each
other with large superpower-equipped armed forces , the Korean
peninsula remains a clear danger to peace and stability in
East Asia. Throughout the 1950 's and 1960 r s China's and
Japan's differing security interests in Korea were manifested
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in Peking's strong support for eliminating the unfriendly
U.S. influences on the peninsula by unification of North
and South under Kim, and by Tokyo's strong support for the
status quo with a strong American presence in Korea to pro-
tect the South from North Korean military adventurism.
The 196 9 Sato-Nixon communique is expressive of this Japanese
policy, declaring that "the security of the Republic of
Korea is essential to Japan's own security." Chinese and
North Korean reaction to the inclusion of South Korea within
the Japanese defense perimeter was vitriolic and forceful.
In April 1970, Chou En-lai met Kim Il-sung in Pyongyang.
Both leaders issued a statement condemning the revival of
Japanese militarism under the active patronage of the U.S.
127
as a dangerous force for aggression in Asia.
The improvement of Sino-Japanese relations following
the breakdown of the Sino-Soviet alliance has, however,
caused Peking to moderate its position on Korea, making
it more compatible with Tokyo's. According to the 1977
Japanese Defense Agency White Paper, the Japanese continue
to see the Korean balance of power as tenuous and its main-
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tenance vital to Japan's national security. Japan's
security interests in the stability of the Korean peninsula
have also been complicated by a rapidly increasing economic
stake in South Korea and a growing financial interest in
North Korea. Japan's basic policy on Korea is "maintaining
and developing friendly and cooperative relations with the
Republic of Korea and promoting a gradual interchange with
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North Korea in such fields as trade, culture, and person
129
to person contact."
Fearful that a crisis could provide Moscow with the
opportunity for exapnding its influence in Korea, Peking
and Tokyo have, since the Chou-Tanaka summit, become more
concerned with preserving the present situation than with
pressing for political change on the peninsula. Privately,
the Chinese leadership has indicated a more tolerant attitude
towards the American military presence in Korea, seeing it
now as an effective counter to Soviet armed strength in the
Far East. Because of North Korea's continuing importance
as a Chinese buffer state, Peking remains a staunch politi-
cal backer of Kim Il-sung, but is now emphasizing that the
goal of reunification must be achieved peacefully. North
Korea's surprisingly positive response in January 1979 to
South Korean appeals to reopen mutual talks on peaceful
reunification may be a direct effect of China's new position
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on Korea, and atrributable to the PFT.
More importantly for Japan's interests, the PFT
augers well for the prospects of longterm peace in Korea.
Recognizing the primacy Japan places on Korean stability,
Teng Hsiao-ping in talks with Prime Minister Fukuda , after
the 23 October 1978 exchange of ratification instruments in
Tokyo said China's support for Kim's policy of reunification
is "well known, but what must be done is for Japan and China
to work together so that North and South Korea can come to
132
the conference table." Failing a negotiated settlement
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of Korea's future status, Teng pointed out to the Tokyo
press corps that "divided countries are ultimately unified . .
.
if these problems can't be solved in 10 years, they will be
solved in 100 years. If not in a century, then in 10
centuries." These remakrs have fueled speculation that the
PFT may lead to a freezing of Korea's divided status and
eventual cross recognition of Seoul by Peking and Moscow in
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return for Tokyo and Washington recognizing Pyongyang.
Regardless, there is little question that the reduc-
tion of tensions in Korea is fundamental to Japan's basic
security goals of peace and stability for East Asia. Making
this point in his explanation before the Diet of potential
ramifications from the PFT, Foreign Minister Sonoda reiterated
that "there can be no peace in Asia without stabilization
134
of the Korean peninsula. " Since any scheme to defuse the
Korean time-bomb will require Chinese concurrence, the
spirit of cooperation engendered by the PFT seems essential
for the establishment of long term Korean stability.
The beneficial effects of the PFT on Japan's security
interests in Korea must be tempered, however, by the reali-
zation that China's present toleration of Japan's and the
United States' support for South Korea is motivated by a
consuming fear of the Soviet Union. In pursuing a stabilization
formula for Korea, Japan would be well advised to remember
that the PFT does not alter Korea's strategic importance
as a Chinese buffer state. Should there be a limited Sino-
Soviet rapprochement, it would not be surprising to see
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Peking's historical need to dominate the peninsula overtake
its present shared interest with Japan in maintaining a
status quo balance of power there. Consequently, Japan is
actually in a very delicate position as far as its security
interests in Korea are concerned, because Peking's desire to
work with Tokyo in averting a destabilizing situations on
the peninsula stems directly from the antipathy of the Sino-
Soviet dispute -- the continuation of which is far more
threatening to the stability and peace of Asia than the Sino-
Japanese rivalry for influence in Korea.
Since the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, the nature
of Tokyo's relations with Taiwan have been sensitive issues
in Sino-Japanese relations. Backed by the U.S. and motivated
by historical links, economic ties, and traditional security
interests, Japan actively reinvolved itself in Taiwan during
the 1950 's and 1960 's, despite Peking's protests that Taiwan
was not a sovereign state but an unliberated Chinese province
The conflict potential between Japan and China abated con-
siderably, however, with Tokyo's recognition, as expressed
in the Chou-Tanaka communique, that "Taiwan is an inalien-
able part of the territory ofthe People's Republic of China."
The fact that Taiwan's status was not a major issue in the
PFT negotiations, with Article 1 of the treaty calling for
the development of peaceful relations on the basis of "...non-
interference in each other's internal affairs..." indicates
that China and Japan have, at least for the time being,
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achieved a modus vivendi on Taiwan's future.
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From 1951 to 1971 Sino-Japanese relations were of an
adversary type, with Peking seeing Tokyo as a puppet of the
U.S. in a conspiracy against its interest in Taiwan. Japan
had serious reservations about suturing itself off from
China, but Prime Minister Yoshida's letter of 24 December
1951 to Secretary of State Dulles pledging to sign a peace
treaty as soon as possible with the Nationalist Chinese on
Taiwan, and to refrain from establishing diplomatic relations
with Peking, was prompted by the fear that to do otherwise
might cause the U.S. Senate not to ratify the Occupation-
ending, San Francisco Peace Treaty. Despite Tokyo's
concern about Chinese intervention in Korea, and Japan's
almost total dependence on the U.S. for security and economic
staples, the Yoshida Letter deftly cleared the way for a
"two China" policy by insisting that any peace treaty between
Japan and Taiwan applied only to the territory actually under
Nationalist control. The Treaty of Peace between Japan and
Nationalist China, signed on 28 April 1952 locked Japan into
officially supporting the anti-communist
,
pro-Taiwan American
security system in Asia. By strictly separating politics
from economic issues, however, the Japanese were able to
establish lucrative trade relations with both the People's
Republic of China and the Republic of China.
Many of the difficulties that beset Sino-Japanese
relations before the Chou-Tanaka summit can be traced to this
"two China" policy, which drove Tokyo into numerous contra-
dictions and exposed it to retaliation by both Chinese
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regimes. Domestic Japanese politics were also affected, as
a succession of conservative administrations found themselves
vulnerable to pressures on the one hand from Peking, pro-
Peking opposition parties within the Diet, and growing public
support for improved relations with the PRC, and on the
other hand, from Washington, Taipei, and pro-Taiwanese
business oriented factions within the LDP. This two-China
approach kept Japan's options open for improved relations
with Peking, but the policy was also a high media-interest
item used by Japanese politicians for maneuvering within the
political system and for questioning Japan's dependence on
American foreign policy leadership.
Conflicting national security interests, however,
remained through the 19 50*3 and 196 0's as the primary
determinant of China and Japan's differing attitudes on
Taiwan. The Yoshida Letter, which set the tone for Sino-
Japnese relations during the period, was drafted in the
context of Peking's 1950 anti-Japanese alliance with the
Soviet Union and naked Chinese aggression in Korea. To
China, Japan's 1951 security treaty with the U.S., which
authorized American bases on Japanese territory for the
purpose of contributing "to the maintenance of the inter-
national peace and security in the Far East..." was particularly
threatening, since it effectively committed Japan to support
the defense of Taiwan in accordance with the 1954 Mutual
Defense Treaty between Washington and Taipei. In his joint
communique of 21 November 19 6 9 with President Nixon, Prime
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Minister Sato publicly reconfirmed Japan's security interest
in Taiwan, declaring it "a most important factor for the
137
security of Japan." The same communique, which stated
that the "mutual security interests of the United States
and Japan could be accommodated within arrangements for
the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to
Japan" brought Peking's security apprehensions about Japan
to a new peak.
Internally weakened by the effects of the Cultural
Revolution, sobered by the Ussuri River clashes with the
Soviets in the winter of 1969, and concerned about Tokyo's
expanding economic influence, China viewed the Sato-Nixon
communique with alarm, fearing that it indicated Japan's
intention to embark on a new (possibly military) role in
Asia with the full support of the U.S. Coupling the Sato-
Nixon communique with the already announced Nixon Doctrine,
the Chinese leadership was undoubtedly given pause by the
possibility that Washington was grooming Tokyo to fill the
vacuum left by the withdrawal of American forces from Korea
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and Taiwan.
Even though Peking intensified its propaganda campaign
against Japan's "remilitarization" under the Fourth Defense
Plan after the Sato-Nixon communique was released, the Chinese
also began to move subtly towards improving Sino-Japanese
relations by cultivating opinion makers opposed to Japan's
close identification with Taiwan and increasing trade with
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Japanese firms. Doak Barnett suggests one of the motivations
behind these tactics was the Chinese belief that normalized
relations with Japan could be used to undercut, or at least
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control, Tokyo's growing influence on Taiwan. Never
enamoured with America's hostile China policy, Japan leaped
at the opportunity presented by the 1972 Nixon visit to the
People's Republic to sever its formal ties with the Nationalists
in return for Chinese toleration of Japan's continued economic
interaction with Taiwan.
Realizing that China presented no credible military
threat to Japan, then Foreign Minister Fukuda announced that
in light of the Chou-Nixon Shanghai communique of 27 February
1972, the Taiwan references in the 1969 Sato-Nixon communique
were no longer operative, thereby reducing Japan's interests
in Taiwan primarily to economics. As political and
economic pressure within Japan pushed for normalization
of relations with China, Prime Minister Sato was replaced
in July 1972 by Tanaka, who immediately requested a summit
with President Nixon. At their Honolulu meeting (31 August
to 1 September) , the new Prime Minister informed the American
President that Japan was ready to pursue a China policy inde-
pendent of the U.S. Four weeks later this affirmation became
fact with the Peking signing of the Chou-Tanaka communique
announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations between
Japan and the People's Republic of China.
Like the Yoshida Letter, the Chou-Tanaka communique,
despite showing an obvious preference for Peking, kept open
90

Japan's options for continuing its two China policy. Bowing
to diplomatic reality, Japan recognized the People's
Republic as the "sole legal government of China," but did
not explicitly accept Peking's claim to Taiwan. Instead,
Tokyo maintained that "the Government of Japan fully under-
stands and respects" China's position on Taiwan and Foreign
Minister Ohira noted that "Japan actually has not said that
Taiwan is a territory of the People's Republic of China.
141There is no difference at all from the past." Furthermore,
the Chou-Tanaka statement made no reference to Japan's 1952
peace treaty with the Nationalists, let alone the need to
abrogate it; nor did the communique mention Japan's security
relationship with the U.S.
An anlaysis of the Chou-Tanaka text suggests that
both Peking and Tokyo wanted to immediately improve Sino-
Japanese relations, but the careful wording used infers that
the Japanes wanted to leave some latitude for determining
their future policy towards Taiwan. In return for accepting
Japanese vagueness in the communique on the future of Tokyo's
relationship with Taipei, the Chinese apparently insisted
that Tokyo clarify its intentions in a less binding forum.
Immediately after the Chou-Tanaka communique, Foreign Minister
Ohira partially fulfilled this assumed obligation by remarking
that the 1952 Japan-Republic of China Treaty "has lost the
basis for existence and is considered to have ceased to be
effective"; that by virtue of Japan's previous acceptance
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of the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations at the San Francisco
Peace Conference that it was "natural" for Tokyo to consider
Taiwan as a part of China; and that Japan would have to
142eventually close its embassy in Taipei. The Taiwanese
government/ in a move to save face, quickly severed rela-
tions, relieving Japan of this onerous task. The Japanese
softened their position, however, by expanding economic ties
with Taiwan, apparently with Peking's acquiescence.
Japan's post-1972 attitude on relations with Taiwan
were summed by Ohira following the Chou-Tanaka summit, when
he said, "we hope to continue economic and cultural relations
with Taiwan. But that will depend on how Taiwan reacts to
143Japan's new relations with China." In actuality the Chou-
Tanaka communique did not represent a departure from the
two-China policy laid down in the 1951 Yoshida Letter; it
simply switched Japan's emphasis from Taipei to Peking. The
PFT does nothing to change the nature of Japan's official
relationship with the PRC or alter its non-official dealings
with the Nationalists as reconstituted in 1972.
Concerning Japanese involvement in the defense of
Taiwan through its security ties with the U.S., the Chou-
Tanaka communique took no cognizance of the U .S .-Japanese
security treaty. Moreover, Peking began to quietly air its
approval of the security pact as a needed counterbalance to
Soviet power in Northeast Asia. In early 1974, for example
Teng, noting that "the U.S. is not so dangerous as the USSR",
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pointed out to visiting Japanese dignitaries that "China
does not affirm the Japan-U.S. security treaty in principle,
but since a threat exists, we think it unavoidable for Japan
to defend its own country [except] by maintaining ties with
144
the United States."
Regarding the applicability of "the Far East Clause"
in Article VI of Japan's security treaty with the U.S., both
Peking and Tokyo have tended to soft peddle the issue since
1972 with ambiguity. Japan's position has been that the
improved climate of Sino-American relations, China's acceptance
of the need for the Japan-U.S. security pact, and the improba-
bility that Peking might resort to force in the Taiwan Straits,
makes it unlikely that Washington would ask to use Japanese
145bases to fulfill American defense commitments to Taiwan.
But the PFT has forced Tokyo to take a more definitive posi-
tion on the security treaty's "Far East Clause" and its
meaning for Taiwan. Replying to the questions from the Diet
floor about the implications of the PFT, Prime Minister
Fukuda expressed his view that the "Far East Clause" no
longer applied to Taiwan as a result of the 1978 Sino-
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Japanese treaty. The relevance of the "Far East Clause"
has, however, been overtaken by events since President
Carter's 15 December 19 7 8 announcement that Washington was
extending diplomatic recognition to Peking and terminating
the Mutual Security Treaty with Taiwan.
In essence, the PFT has not modified the tacit
agreement in the 197 2 Chou-Tanaka communique that both sides
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would accept deliberate ambiguities on the future status of
Taiwan so the issue would not disrupt the evolvement of
friendlier Sino-Japanese relations. For Tokyo, its security
interests are best served by a continuation of the post 1972
status quo in Taiwan and the PFT tends to support this
policy.
A few conservative Japanese leaders like Nakasone
might favor an independent Taiwan, but such an eventuality
could force Japan to chose between jeopardizing its Peking
links and its unofficial but lucrative commercial ties with
Taipei. Also, an independent Taiwan, resentful of Japan's
improving relations with mainland China, might threaten
Japanese shipping lanes in the East China Sea.
Ultimately, the question of whether or not Taiwan
will seriously complicate Sino-Japanese relations hinges on
Peking's tactics for pursuing its goal of reunification.
Unquestionably, the majority of Japanese would prefer to see
any reunification with the mainland government occur gradually
and with minimum disruption to Japan's economic links with
Taiwan. By fostering stronger political and economic ties
with China, the PFT should give Japan increased diplomatic
leverage to assure that any reunification would be evolutionary
and nore prejudicial to Japan's economic or security inter-
ests. Like the Chou-Tanaka communique, the PFT stresses
the mutual benefit of improved relations for preventing
Taiwan from becoming a major security issue in the future.
Nonetheless, it must be remembered that the PFT does nothing
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specifically to assuage the inherent conflict of interests
between Peking's irredentist perspective on Taiwan and
Tokyo's economic involvement with the Nationalists.
The PFT's potential for amicably resolving differing
Sino-Japanese security interests in Southeast Asia, the
East China Sea, Korea, and Taiwan rests on the priority each
side places on the need for cooperation with the other. As
long as Peking feels threatened by the Soviet Union and
needs Japanese technology, the PFT will be a positive induce-
ment for the Chinese not to forceably challenge Japanese
security interest in East Asia. Conversely, Japan's over-
whelming dependence on foreign raw materials and markets
makes it more interested in cooperation than conflict with
China. From these complementary needs, the PFT clearly con-
tributes to the achievement of Japan's security goals of
avoiding conflict and maintaining stability by deferring
all of the volatile issues in Sino-Japanese relations.
The long range question for Japanese security planners
is whether or not the current optimism about the future of
Sino-Japanese relations generated by the conclusion of the
PFT will create an atmosphere of mutual trust capable of
permanently settling conflicting security interests between
Japan and China that have persisted since the founding of
the People's Republic.
2 . Japanese-Soviet Security Relations
While the PFT appears supportive of Japan's security
goals with China, the present animosity in Sino-Soviet
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relations makes closer ties with Peking a zero-sum game for
Tokyo in regard to Japanese-Soviet security issues. Moscow
has consistently argued with Tokyo that the PFT's anti-hegemony
clause is pointedly anti-Soviet, and after the treaty was
signed Soviet Premier Kosygin warned a visiting group of
Japanese Dietmen that the treaty would prove to be an
"historic error" for Japan since "it is easy to spoil a
147friendship, but it won't be easy to restore it."
Japan, naturally, insists that the PFT is pro-Chinese,
not anti-Soviet, and that "Japan would be embarrassed if
148its Soviet policy is affected by the treaty." According
to the Japanese, Article IV of the PFT, which states the
"treaty shall not affect the position of either contracting
party regarding its relations with third countries" should
alleviate the Kremlin's fear that a new anti-Soviet, Sino-
Japanese alliance is in gestation. The Japanese contend
that Moscow is misinterpreting the anti-hegemony clause and
that the PFT in no way commits Japan to support China's
foreign policy. In fact, Prime Minister Fukuda, in his
speech to the Diet calling for swift ratification of the
PFT, emphasized the importance of promoting friendly rela-
tions with the Soviet Union on the basis of "correct mutual
149
understanding.
Rivals for power in East Asia over the past century,
the Japanese and Russians neither like nor trust each other.
The residual animosity from two wars, a history of clashes
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in Siberia, Mongolia, and Manchuria, and Moscow's violation
of its neutrality agreement with Tokyo near the end of
World War II, has been aggravated recently by Soviet refusal
to return the disputed "Northern Territories", to compromise
on fishing quotas, and its support for Hanoi's militarist
policies in Southeast Asia.
On the surface, it would appear that Japan's present
tilt towards China would not be conducive to settling any
outstanding differences with the Soviet Union, but with the
Sino-Soviet confrontation intensifying, the specter of a
Sino-Japanese axis developing in East Asia may give the
Japanese additional leverage with the Kremlin. At present,
however, it is unclear whether the PFT is a stimulant or
a depressant to Japan's goal of establishing with the Soviet
Union "stable relations of good-neighborliness and friendship
based on mutual understanding and trust."
Concerning the disputed "Northern Territories " , the
Soviet refusal to even consider negotiations about the
possible return of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai
has, since the restoration of diplomatic recognition in
1956, been the most important impediment to the improvement
of relations between Moscow and Tokyo. Japan, claiming that
the four islands in question have never been historically
or geographically considered part of the Kuril chain, and
therefore not subject to the San Francisco Treaty's concession
of this island chain to the Soviet Union, adamantly demands
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the return of the "Northern Territories" as a precondition
for opening negotiations with Moscow on a peace treaty.
The Soviets contend "there is no territorial problem"
between them and the Japanese as the status of the "Northern
Territories" was resolved at Yalta and confirmed in San
Francisco. The negotiations and signing of the PFT have
done nothing to ease this impasse. In fact, the PFT has
resulted in both Moscow and Tokyo reaffirmign their past
positions on the "Northern Territories" issue.
Throughout 1978, as the PFT negotiations moved
towards fruition, the Kremlin added the "anti-Sovietism" of
the treaty an another justification for rejecting Japan's
. . 152petitions for the return of the disputed islands. In
June, the Soviets responded to Fukuda * s announcement that
PFT negotiations would be reoped in July by conducting large
scale naval maneuvers in the vicinity of Etorofu. The exer-
cise of most of the Soviet Pacific Fleet and the airlift
of 1,000 troops in a non-normal Soviet training area con-
vinced most observers that the "Northern Territories" would
be used by Moscow as a forum for protesting closer Japanese
ties with China. Since the conclusion of the PFT, the
Soviets have emphasized that their position on the "Northern
Territories" issue remains unchanged. Reflecting the stern-
ness of their posture are reports that the Soviets are
building a base for ground troops on Kunashiri Island and
their curtailment of family visitation rights to "Northern
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Territories" grave sites, owing to the "general circum-
154
stances" of Soviet-Japanese relations.
The PFT has resulted in no appreciable change in
the Japanese position on the "Northern Territories" question.
In February 1978, just after the initial indications that
Japan and China were seriously considering a resumption of
their stalled PFT talks, Brezhnev in a letter to Prime Minister
Fukuda proposed a Treaty on Good Neighborhood and Coopera-
tion between the USSR and Japan, pending the settlement of
a peace treaty. Fukuda rejected the proposal, pointing out
that the solution to the "Northern Territories" problem must
be found before Japan will consider any bilateral treaties
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with the Soviet Union. Even though the Japanese have made
numerous statements since signing of the PFT about the need
to "mend strained bilateral relations" with the Soviets,
Tokyo continues to link the return of the "Northern Terri-
tories" to any improvement in Japanese-Soviet ties. Making
this point, Cabinet Secretary Abe said to a group of Japanese
businessmen in September 1978 that "it was an immediate
diplomatic task of the Japanese government to restore the
Soviet-held Japanese territory and conclude a long pending
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peace treaty with the Russians."
While the PFT thus far has resulted only in a
restatement of each side's basic position on the "Northern
Territories" issue, Japan may be forced to modify its stance
because of the contradiction between its willingness to
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conclude a peace treaty with China without settling the
Senkaku's question and its refusal to even discuss a peace
treaty with the Soviets until all territorial disputes are
resolved. By establishing a model disallowing emotion laden
territorial issues to stand in the way of improved diplomatic
relations, the PFT could eventually cause Japan to drop its
insistence on a return of the disputed islands as a precondi-
tion for concluding a peace treaty, as desired by the Soviets.
This would undoubtedly reduce Soviet-Japanese tensions, but
on terms more favorable to Moscow than Japan.
For the time being, however, Japan will probably
continue to press its claims for a return of the "Northern
Territories." Not only is this an emotional issue with the
Japanese electorate, but the Chinese, who themselves have
serious territorial claims against the Soviets and have
steadfastly supported the Japanese position, might be miffed
by Tokyo's giving way. More practically, many Japanese see
the "Northern Territories" as a valuable negotiating chip,
which should not be given up without major Soviet concessions
in other areas, such as fishing quotas and resource develop-
ment in Siberia. The "Northern Territories" have also taken
on a new economic significance in view of Tokyo's and Moscow's
overlapping claims to fishing and seabed rights in the
Northwestern Pacific.
Though not as emotional as territorial differences,
Japan's increasing competition with the Soviet Union over
100

fishing rights is potentially a greater source of conflict
since fish are so important for meeting the protein needs
of both nations. The fisheries issues between Japan and
the Soviet Union have been further aggravated by the de facto
international acceptance of a coastal state's right to
establish a 200 mile economic zone. In the aftermath of
the U.S. and Canada declaring 200 mile zones off their
coasts, the waters of the North Pacific became particularly
important to both the Russian and the Japanese fishing
industries for making up the differences in their catches.
In March 1977 the Soviets, attempting to compensate for
their catch losses off North America, declared their own
200 mile economic zone and severely restricted Japanese
fishing operations within it.
Inevitably, the fisheries issues became entangled
with the territorial question as Moscow used the disputed
"Northern Territories" to subtend the boundary lines of its
economic zone. When Japanese attempts to negotiate an
equitable catch quota in the Soviet zone broke down in April
1977 over the Kremlin's repeated attempts to get Tokyo to
admit Russian sovereignty over the four disputed islands by
accepting Soviet jurisdiction throughout its claimed economic
zone, Japan countered with its own 200 mile zone based on
the "Northern Territories" being Japanese. This represented
a reversal of Japan's long standing policy of opposing
exclusive national economic zones, and was done primarily
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to improve Japan's negotiating position with the Soviet
Union on catch quotas. The fact that Japan specifically
waived any restrictions on Chinese or South Korean fishing
vessels within its zone made this point abundantly clear.
Subsequently, two temporary agreements setting catch
quotas in each other's 200 mile zones were reached in summer
1977 when Japan, under considerable domestic pressure from
the powerful fisheries lobby to conclude an arrangement with
Moscow, agreed to reduce its catch in the Soviet zone by as
much as 40 percent, to take no salmon or herring, and to
accept de facto but no de jure Soviet control over the
"Northern Territories" for purposes of regulating fishing
15 8
rights only. To the Japanese these initial fisheries
agreements represented an arbitrary exercise of Soviet super-
power status, with Moscow intent on demonstrating to Tokyo
that Japan could not successfully challenge Soviet interests
in Asia. Though never officially connected, the Soviet
hardline attitude on the fisheries issue may well have been
the kindling for Japan's renewed interest in early 1978 for
concluding the PFT.
While there is a substantial economic rationale for
Moscow severely restricting Japanese fishing rights in the
Soviet economic zone, the Kremlin has used the fishing
rights negotiations throughout 1978 as a means of expressing
Soviet displeasure with Japan over the PFT. After drastically
reducing Japan's highly profitable salmon quota and
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159instituting a "fishery cooperative fee" in April, the
Soviets reneged in June on an agreement reached earlier in
1978 to engage in four joint fishery operations within the
Soviet 200 mile economic zone with private Japanese firms.
The reason Moscow gave for backing out of the joint fisheries
ventures, just as they were about to be implemented, was the
announced resumption of Sino-Japanese PFT negotiations, which
the Soviets claimed would be an obstacle to friendly Japanese-
160Soviet relations. In an obvious diplomatic snub, the
Soviets refused to renew the visas of the Japanese delegation
sent to Moscow to see if the joint venture agreements could
1 fi 1
be salvaged. Since the PFT was signed, the Russians also
stalled negotiating on 1979 catch quotas and rejected Japanese
suggestions for replacing the current system of one year
16 2provisional fisheries agreements with a long term pact.
Japanese-Soviet competition for the northwestern
Pacific fishing catch has historically been cantankerous
because of the high economic stakes, and the possibility for
a "Cod War" confrontation has increased considerably with the
delimitation of 200 mile economic zones and the establishment
of catch quotas . By binding itself politically and economically
more closely with China through the PFT, the Japanese have
brought Sino-Soviet polemics to the fisheries question and
thereby stiffened Soviet resolve not to make concessions.
With Japan dependent on fish products for 51 percent of its
protein intake, and lacking the military strength to effec-
tively challenge Soviet harassment of Japanese fishing
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operations, the fisheries issue provides Moscow with a low
risk, highly capable lever for moderating Japanese coopera-
4-u ^u- 163tion with China.
Because the PFT has reduced interest in a compromise
on allocating northwestern Pacific fishing rights, which
Tokyo needs more than Moscow, the new accord with China is
not likely to help stabilize relations with the Soviet Union.
As a result, Japan will have to delicately assess its need
for Chinese raw materials against the possibility of further
reduced catches in the Soviet 200 mile economic zone.
Indochina is another area where Moscow can express
its displeasure with Japan's closer association with China.
Southeast Asia is Tokyo's second largest trading partner,
with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
164
accounting for twelve percent of Japan's total trade.
Consequently, Hanoi's June 1978 decision to join COMECON was
as alarming to the Japanese as it was to the Chinese. This
economic link between Moscow and Hanoi probably increased
both Tokyo's and Peking's interest in concluding the PFT.
For Japan there is the fear that Vietnam's new connections
with the Soviet international economic system might develop
into a conduit for trade between ASEAN and COMECON, a develop-
ment which could be extremely detrimental to Japanese economic
1 r r
trading patterns. China, of course, is an atractive
alternative for offsetting any Japanese market losses in
Southeast Asia. For China, Vietnam's association with COMECON
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was correctly read as an indicator of growing Soviet
involvement in Southeast Asia and a further deterioration
16 6in Sino-Soviet relations.
This deterioration continued with the signing of
the Soviet-Vietnamese peace and friendship treaty in
November 19 78. The Japanese Foreign Ministry's assessment
that this treaty "may have major adverse effects on stability
16 7
in Asia" proved to be timely and accurate when Vietnam
invaded Cambodia and established the puppet regime of Kampuchea
in January 1979. China retaliated in February with a "puni-
tive" attack along Vietnam's northern border, demanding that
Hanoi withdraw its forces from Cambodia. Timing alone makes
it difficult to disassociate Hanoi's new treaty relations with
Moscow from Peking's fully normalized relations with Tokyo
16 8
and Washington, and the outbreak of a Sino-Vietnamese war.
Prior to the Sino-Vietnamese border war of 1979,
the PFT was designed to serve both Japan's and China's
interests in Southeast Asia of stabilizing the region poli-
tically for economic development, while limiting Soviet and
Vietnamese opportunities for gaining greater influence in
the area. Touting an Asian collective security system since
169
196 9 as a means for outflanking China, the signing of
the PFT, with Peking and Hanoi at loggerheads, may have given
the Soviets the leverage they needed to secure a toehold in
a ^u 4- TV • 170Southeast Asia.
Moscow's new position in Vietnam is not only strate-
gically threatening to China, but also an effective diplomatic
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and economic counter to the PFT. According to sources in
Tokyo, the Soviets are hoping to embarrass the Japanese
over Chinese hegemonism in Southeast Asia, while pointing
out that Japan has little room to complain since the Soviet-
Vietnamese treaty, like the PFT, has a clause stating that
the pact is not aimed against the interests of any third
171
country.
If relations between Peking and Hanoi continue to
deteriorate, if Vietnam's policy of military expansionism
goes unchecked, and if Soviet influence in Southeast Asia
increases, then Japan's new relationship with China through
the PFT could prove to be a liability. On the other hand,
the ASEAN nations might seek closer ties with China and
Japan as a means of offsetting Soviet and Vietnamese power
in Southeast Asia. This could be a net plus for Japan. In
any event, aggressive manifestations of the Sino-Soviet con-
flict through Cambodian and Vietnamese surrogates and open
warfare along the China-Vietnam border are likely to cause
Japan to rethink its strategy of offering economic aid,
technological assistance, and diplomatic good offices to
stabilize the situation in Southeast Asia.
Unquestionably, the greatest challenge to Japan's
goal of promoting Asian stability resides in an eruption
of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Aligning Japan's industrial
strength with China's masssive population and raw material
base does little to relieve Moscow's apprehensions about
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Peking's motives for seeking the PFT. On the positive
side, continuation of the Sino-Soviet split at a level below
open hostilities does provide Tokyo with the relative advan-
tage of making Japan's friendship important to the security
equation of its two most powerful neighbors. Furthermore,
a reduction in Sino-Soviet tensions, which Robert Scalapino
172
sees as inevitable, could leave Japan outside of the
mainstream of Asian security issues and up against a Sino-
Soviet dominated market and raw materials cartel in Asia.
Regardless of these factors, the harshness of Soviet
policy towards Japan since the Chou-Tanaka summit made the
PFT a diplomatic necessity for Japan. Further delay in
concluding the treaty would have risked a serious decline
in relations with China needlessly, since Moscow was not
optimistic about any near-term improvement in relations with
Tokyo and saw no reason to make any concessions because of
Japna's precarious economic and military position. In the
past, Japan has sought to neutralize Russian strength in
Asia by allying itself with Moscow's major adversary — Britain
in 1902, Germany in 1941, and the United States in 1951 —
and the PFT is indicative of this diplomatic pattern
continuing.
To the degree that the PFT stabilizes Sino-Japanese
relations on the basis of the 1972 Chou-Tanaka communique,
it should increase proportionately the possibilities of some
form of Soviet retaliation against Japan. In its official
response to the PFT signing, the Kremlin warned that Japan
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would be held responsible for any "complications" that might
arise in East Asia as a result of the treaty and for any
"negative consequences" it might have on Soviet-Japanese
173
relations. Because of the Soviet Union's military reach,
Japan's post-PFT policy must concentrate on convincing
Moscow that Japan, is not interested in strengthening China
against the USSR, and of the continued strategic and economic
value a friendly Japan is to Soviet interests in the Far
East.
Throughout the negotiating process leading to the
PFT, the Japanese have been confident that Soviet reaction
to the treaty would be restrained by Moscow's compelling
need for Japanese capital and technology in developing
Siberia. The Japanese also see the Soviets not wanting to
antagonize Japan because of the home islands' strategic
location athwart the sea and air lines of communication to
. . . 174
the Soviet Maritime Province.
Even so, Japan's signing the PFT in the face of Soviet
protestation is not likely to induce Moscow to be compro-
mising on the "Northern Territories" question, the fisheries
issue, or Southeast Asia, and could inadvertently draw Japan
into the flak pattern of the Sino-Soviet dispute. It is
not correct, however, to assume that had Japan not signed
the PFT that relations with the Soviet Union would have
automatically improved. This is simply not the case,
because the PFT is more a result of the poor state of
Japanese-Soviet relations than a cause of them.
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3. Japanese-American Security Relations
The special relationship that has existed between
Japan and the United States since the end of the Occupation
in 1952 remains the principal determinant of Japanese foreign
and security policy calculations. In an apt metaphor, Zbigniew
Brezezinski, noted, "America has been both Japan's roof
against the rain and its window on the world." While
Japan's renewed economic strength, the development of the
Sino-Soviet conflict, and the Nixon Doctrine, have fostered
a new sense of independence in Tokyo, the world remains
bipolar in a strategic sense and Japan still needs the American
nuclear umbrella to shield itself against the threat posed
by the Soviet Union. Despite some current friction over
trade policy and base rights, the growing Soviet military
capability in the Pacific and the independence the security
agreement with Washington gave Japan in negotiating the PFT,
emphatically reminded the Japanese of the importance of
retaining the American security guarantee.
The original pattern of Japan's post-World War II
security policy was forged by the stark realities of emerging
Cold War bipolarity, where both Moscow and Peking in tandem
appeared ready to take advantage of Japan's weakened condition.
A security pact with the U.S. was, at the time, the only
viable option for dealing with the security threat posed to
Japan. The self-confidence associated with Japan's economic
recovery, the generally lowered American Asiatic profile
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forecasted by the Nixon Doctrine, the broadening gulf between
Moscow and Peking, the thaw in Sino-American relations signaled
by the Shanghai communique, the cordiality of the Chou-Tanaka
summit, and the U.S. -USSR agreement in streategic arms limi-
tations (SALT), caused many Japanese in the early 1970 r s
to not only question the credibility of the American security
commitment but to also ask whether it had become anachronis-
tic. According to popular Japanese reasoning at the time,
many of the basic assumptions underlying the continuance of
security ties with the U.S. appeared to lose their relevance
after Japan and China reestablished diplomatic relations in
1972. 176
Even though the international climate was improving,
from Japan's perspective, the 1973 "oil crisis" and Moscow's
hardening attitude towards Tokyo because of its friendlier
relations with Peking reminded the Japanese of their vulnera-
bility and need for security. Consequently, there is little
dispute among observers of Japanese politics that pulbic
support for the "American connection" is now more intense
than ever before. According to an August 1978 opinion poll,
74 percent of Japanese young people in the 2 to 29 age
bracket now favor the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty as compared
177
to 38 percent in 1969.
There are numerous reasons for this renewed support,
not the least of which is that, even with its new relation-
ship with China, Japan has no alternative to the American
defensive shield. Should the security treaty with the U.S.
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be terminated, Japan would have a choice of unarmed neu-
trality, a rearmed independent Gaullist policy, or the
development of some sort of regional security system.
None of these options are particularly suited for
achieving Japan's basic goals of security, prosperity,
and status. Unarmed neutrality would allow lesser military
powers to take advantage of Japan economically. Furthermore,
neutrality would be contingent upon the perception that
Japan was in no position to threaten the interests of other
nations; a circumstance which is harldy the case considering
Japan's industrial strength.
An independent Gaullist policy would require a
rapid expansion of military capabilities. Such a policy
would entail heavy political and economic costs for Tokyo,
with its sincere adversion to nuclear weapons. Additionally,
a rearmed Japan might be a cause for considerable concern
in Moscow and Peking, thereby increasing Japan's overall
security problems. Multilateral security arrangements are
hampered in Asia by an asymmetry of national interest, cultural
values, and systems of government. Also, memories of the
"Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" would make other
nations extremely cautious about joining a security group
led by Japan. From Tokyo's perspective, regional security
agreements could also reduce economic options by forcing a
closer association between trade and foreign policy, and
there is no regional alignment capable of effectively facing
up to the Soviet conventional or nuclear threat.
Ill

By comparison with the other options, continuation
of a close security relationship with the U.S. makes sense
because it allows Japan to obtain maximum defense for mini-
mum expenditure. This security linkage is also complementary
to Japanese economic interests, since the U.S. is Japan's
largest trading partner. Additionally, by minimizing the
possibility that Japan will reconstitute itself as an
autonomous, well armed military power, the American security
treaty can also be seen as serving Soviet and Chinese regional
security interests.
More significantly, the American commitment to defend
Japan has given the Japanese reasonable leverage in its
dealings with both the Soviet Union and China. Unques-
tionably, the security treaty has inhibited Moscow's response
to Japan's policy of seeking closer economic and political
ties with China. Without this defensive shield, Japan might
have been forced to take greater heed of Soviet opposition
to the PFT. Even though the security treaty is, in effect,
underwriting Japan's new relationship with China, the Soviets
have grown more tolerant of Tokyo's continued association with
Washington because the security treaty prevents Japan from
moving completely into the Chinese orbit.
There is little empirical evidence to dispute the
contention that Japan's security ties with the U.S. were
crucial to the pattern of negotiations leading to the signing
of the PFT, but there is the possibility that the Sino-
Japanese pact could adversely affect Tokyo's relations with
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Washington. Even with President Carter's announcment that
the PRC and U.S. would exchange ambassadors in 1979, many-
differences remain between Peking and Washington, and Japan
could find itself forced to decide between supporting China
or the U.S. on any number of issues.
Korea immediately assumes center stage as an area
where such a dilemma might manifest itself. In the event
of a military crisis on the peninsula, might not the politi-
cal and economic advantages associated with the PFT cause
Japan to seriously consider siding against the U.S. if
Peking supported Pyongyang? The Japanese, naturally, dis-
miss such scenarios as extremely unlikely, contending closer
Sino-Japanese relations reduce the possibility of confron-
tation in Korea or any other area, making such choices
178between the Chines or American position moot. What the
Japanese, of course, do not say is that the PFT gives Tokyo
an improved bargaining position with regards to American
security policy in Northeast Asia.
In short, there appears to be a preponderance of
evidence suggesting that the Japanese see the PFT as com-
plementing their security ties with the U.S. First, the
Japanese have no immediate alternative capable of providing
adequate security, and it does reinforce existing patterns
of trade for Tokyo. Second, the American security treaty
is favored by the Chinese because of its anti-Soviet thrust
and because it frees Japanese capital for investment in
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China that might otherwise be used for defense. Third, it
allows Japan to diversify its sources of raw materials and
markets through closer relations with China, relatively free
from fear of aggressive Soviet reaction. Fourth, the security
treaty with the U.S. is accepted by the Soviets as a short-
term device for checking Chinese influence over Japan. Fifth,
the Japanese population in general sees alliance with America
as necessary for maintaining Japan's security.
In the near term, especially with the normalization
of Sino-American relations, there seems to be little chance
of conflict between the Japanese-American Security Treaty
and Japan's warmer relations with China. Over the longer run,
however, the PFT could dilute the importance of the American
security alliance if Sino-Japanese relations continue to
flourish and if economics continues to play an increasing
role in security decisions. In the atmosphere of growing
economic competition between Japan and the U.S., the possi-
bility certainly exists that Peking may be able to use the
commercial advantages Tokyo derives from the PFT to play
Japan off against the U.S. in much the same way that Japan
has used its American security treaty to take advantage of
Sino-Soviet differences over the past decade.
B. THE PFT'S IMPACT ON JAPANESE ECONOMIC INTERESTS
Japan is a manufacturing nation that must trade to sur-
vive. Because Japan's prosperity is dependent on a self-
closing feedback loop of exchanging finished goods and technology
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for raw materials and energy, a basic premise of Japanese
foreign policy must be the assurance of access to natural
resources and the expansion of export markets to generate
balance of payment credits to pay for needed imports. By
extension, Japan's continued economic development requires
international stability and a free trade environment to
prevent the disruption of the Japanese economic pattern of
using exports to finance the escalating costs of imports.
The rapidity and magnitude of Japan's post World War II
179
economic growth is well documented, but the fragile
Japanese dependence on foreign suppliers and buyers has been
the basis of Japan's close economic ties with the U.S., and
of China's and the Soviet Union's designs for improving
relations with Tokyo.
In the wake of the 1973 oil crisis, Japan was shocked
into intensifying its efforts to diversify both its sources
of raw materials and its markets away from their heavy
reliance on the U.S.; this diversification effort led
eventually to China and the PFT. Representing a departure
from Japan's successful formula for keeping foreign policy
and international economics separate, the conclusion of the
PFT is important because it initiated a potentially lucrative
new pattern of trade with China, which also significantly
affects political and economic relations between Japan, the
Soviet Union, and the United States.
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1. The PFT's Impact on Sino-Japanese Economic Relations
The complementary nature of the Japanese and Chinese
economies is reflected by the long series of unofficial trade
agreements dating back to 1952, which tacitly recognized
the natural linkage between Japan's needs for raw materials
and China's requirements for capital improvements. This
relationship in which Japan accounted for 19 percent of
180China's foreign trade by 1972, was, however, extremely
unpredictable because of the diplomatic estrangement that
existed between Tokyo and Peking. Even after diplomatic
relations were renewed in 1972, Sino-Japanese trade was
limited by a combination of rightwing LDP political pressures,
Soviet warnings about strengthening China, and Peking's
181policies about foreign investment. What was lacking in
Tokyo was a confidence that increased trade with China
would contribute significantly to Japan's security, pros-
perity, and status.
The PFT represents a reversal of this view by
committing Japan to a foreign policy that now presumes a
friendly and cooperative relationship with China. This
renewed identification of China with Japanese national
interests resulted primarily from a unique sequence of events
between 1975 and 1978. Japanese negotiations with the
Soviets for rights to develop Siberian resources had already
broken down and Moscow was becoming increasingly stubborn
about the "Northern Territories" and Japanese fishing quotas.
The U.S. began to pressure Japan about reducing its balance
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of payment surplus by limiting exports and increasing
imports — a policy the Japanese did not believe they could
afford, assuming the increased price for oil. Furthermore,
a slumping domestic economy convinced the Fukuda government
that it needed a foreign policy success to shore up its
sagging domestic political fortunes. At the same time,
Teng Hsaio-ping's policy of modernization was getting
underway, forcing China to be more pragmatic about
foreign investment. In this context, it became obvious
that the benefits from signing the PFT — even one with an
anti-hegemony clause — were beginning to outweigh the
risks
.
The decision to sign the PFT resulted in a trade
bonanza for Japan. Published reports indicate that Japan-
China trade between January and June 1978, in anticipation
of the treaty signing, jumped 16 percent on a yen basis and
182
42 percent on a dollar index. The prognosis is for even
larger increases. During his October 1978 Tokyo visit to
exchange instruments of ratification, Teng said the $20
billion, eight year trade agreement concluded in February
18 3
1978, should be "doubled and doubled again." Along
this same optimistic line, a Japanese brokerage house is
predicting a "boom" on the basis of annual trade between
184
Japan and China doubling to $7 billion by 1981.
Besides the magnitude of the new China trade, it is
well suited to Japan's economic needs. For example, under
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the February 1978 trade agreement, the Japanese contracted
to sell the Chinese- $7 to $8 billion worth of plant and
technology items plus an additinal $2 to $3 billion worth
of construction materials and equipment over the next year
in return for increasing amounts of Chinese crude oil and
185
coal. With Chinese demand presently concentrated on
procuring petrochemical processing, steel, heavy machinery,
and electronics technologies, Japanese industrialists are
hopeful that the expanding Chinese market will alleviate a
recession, help offset mounting competition from new Asian
industrial rivals like South Korea, and ease the balance of
payments problem with the U.S. by reducing export pressures
on the American market. Japanese willingness to provide
offshore drilling technology, which China lacks, also
increases the likelihood that both nations will come to an
amicable solution for allocating continental shelf resources
18 6
in the East China Sea.
Additinally, access to Chinese resources and markets
gives Japan increased leverage with the Soviet Union by
insulating the Japanese from Russian policy ploys based on
Soviet military strength or economic power. Nor should the
value of the political framework established by the PFT for
codifying Sino-Japanese trade agreements be forgotten.
Thus far, Japan's only serious concern about the
development of its post-PFT trade with China is in the area
of finances. Even when the volume of Sino-Japanese trade
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was minimal, Japan consistently ran a trade surplus and
China's balance of payments deficit should increase if
bilateral trade develops according to present forecasts.
It was feared in Tokyo that traditional Chinese rejection
of all foreign investment would be the single most formidable
bottleneck on trade between the two countries.
This problem has failed to materialize, as China
has demonstrated an unexpected degree of flexibility on
the question of finances. Not only has Peking agreed to
accept commercially based credit from the Japanese Export-
Import Bank, but it has also shown a willingness to engage
in joint development, processing on commission, and payment
in kind for desired Japanese goods and technology. Nonethe-
less, to reduce its balance of payments deficit from this
growing volume of trade, China must produce oil and Japan
must buy it. Japan is presently committed to purchase 47.1
million tons of Chinese oil over the next five years and some
Sinophiles in Tokyo would like to see the amount increased
to 40 or 50 million tons annually, or approximately 10
187percent of Japan's oil imports.
The difficulty with this proposition is that the
Japanese refining industry lacks the heavy cracking facili-
ties needed to profitably refine paraffinated Chinese crude.
Because of the importance of Chinese oil to the smooth
acceleration of Sino-Japanese trade, Tokyo is already con-
sidering either subsidizing the refining industry to make
the necessary improvements for handling China crude or
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18 8building new, specially equipped, government-owned refineries.
Despite the increased refining costs, which could limit
Sino-Japanese trade volume from a balance of payments stand-
point, the importation of Chinese crude, along with the
availability of increased petroleum supplies from Mexico
and Malaysia, would seriously challenge the OPEC cartel's
18 9hold on Japan. While it is doubtful that China would be
interested in seriously undercutting the OPEC price structure,
the opportunity to decrease its dependence on Middle East
oil gives Japan increased economic and political leverage
in the international arena. If the PFT results in greater
competiton for the sizeable Japanese oil market, then the
treaty will have significantly improved Japan's security
posture and its prospects for continued prosperity.
Even though the PFT has opened up new vistas for
trade between both countries, there are legitimate reasons,
besides a growing Chinese trade deficit, for pessimism about
the long term effects that large scale trade with China
might have on Japanese national interests.
In the first place, cautious Japanese are skeptical
as to whether or not this initial surge of buying by the
Chinese is creating a false impression about the size of the
Chinese market. Not only is there a limit on how much tech-
nology China can absorb, but Tokyo can also expect keen
competition from the British, French, West Germans, and the
Americans for sales in this market. A potentially serious
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side effect of this competition could be a deterioration
in economic and political relations between Japan and any
or all of its major western trading partners.
Not to be overlooked is the possibility that the
sale of plant technology, such as the Paoshan steel mill,
which will be capable of producing six million tons a year
when complete in 1981, may be counter productive to the
continued growth of Japanese exports to China. Once the
Chinese have turnkey technology there is no reason for them
to buy it again, and it is only logical to assume they will
use the technology purchased to increase their indigenous
productive capacity to limit their dependence on imported
goods. Furthermore, as China's industrial demands develop,
Peking may no longer have sufficient raw material surpluses
for export.
The Chinese also have a history of using trade
relations to pressure Japan politically. Throughout the
1950' s and 1960 's Peking regularly curtailed trade to
signal its displeasure with Japan's alliance with the U.S.
and diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. The abrupt and
almost complete severance of economic relations associated
with the 1958 Nagasaki Flag Incident is perhaps the most
celebrated use of Chinese economic leverage to protest
190
Japanese foreign policy. More recently, the Chinese
refusal to allow the continued appearance of the Nationalist
flag on Taiwanese airliners serving Japan complicated the
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negotiations surrounding the 1974 Sino-Japanese aviation
agreement and reminded Tokyo that Japanese financial ties
191
with Taiwan could still be exploited by Peking. Peking
may choose to use this same technique again to pressure Japan
into a more anti-Soviet stance as Japanese economic involve-
ment in China increases as a result of the PFT.
Certainly, a strong argument can be made that the
political rapport accompanying the PFT and the complementary
nature of the Japanese and Chinese economies should be suffi-
cient to overcome immediate obstacles to the development of
a strong, mutually beneficial, trading relationship. But
over time, the drastic dfifferences in Japanese and Chinese
economic philosophies virtually eliminates any possibility
of a Sino-Japanese trading block emerging. Japan is a
resource-poor, capitalistic, stauts quo-democratic polity,
which, by necessity, is committed to a system of free trade
and economic interdependence. Conversely, China is a resource
rich, socialist, autocratic, revolutionary state, which
historically has valued economic independence to international
interdependence. Unless there is a philosophic catharsis,
it would seem that while the capacity of each nation to
meet the other's immediate economic needs have put them in
the same bed, the Japanese and Chinese dream different dreams
about the economic future of their relationship. In the
wake of the PFT, Japan is euphoric about the long term
possibilities of trading technologically intensive products
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for Chinese raw materials; for its part, China is hopeful
that the PFT will provide increased access to Japanese
technology, which will put China on the road to economic
self-sufficiency.
Reagrdless of the ultimate limits placed on Sino-
Japanese relations by their antithetical economic systems,
the PFT has accentuated the positive by quantitatively boosting
the level of bilateral trade and rekindling a warm spirit
of diplomatic friendship betwen Tokyo and Peking. For the
foreseeable future, this emphasis on the positive and
mutuality of economic needs will continue to push Sino-
Japanese trade toward record levels. On this basis the
PFT must be viewed as contributing to Japan's prosperity.
2 . The PFT's Impact on Japanese-Soviet Economic Relations
With the PFT signed and Sino-Japanese trade exceeding
all expectations, the Japanese government has announced its
intentions to concentrate on improving Japan-Soviet rela-
192tions through expanded economic activity. As with the
Chinese, there is a symbiotic relationship between Japanese
interest in access to the natural resources of Siberia and
the Soviet desire for Japanese capital and technology to
promote the more rapid development of the Soviet Far East.
Unlike the Chinese, however, the Japanese neither like nor
trust the Russians, making Tokyo inclined to insist on a




The restrained response thus far by the Soviets to
the signing of the PFT, has raised hopes in Japanese business
and political circles that Moscow will be receptive to
economic initiatives as a basis for improving the overall
nature of Japanese-Soviet relations. Moscow, of course,
denounces the PFT as being patently anti-Soviet, but it has
directed the brunt of its critism at China while officially
informing Tokyo that the Soviet Union will "base its judgment
on Japan's practical actions, not on its words" in formulating
193future policy towards Tokyo.
Already the PFT is apparently having the desired effect
of giving the Japanese added leverage with the Soviets.
Not only have Premier Kosygin and Foreign Minister Gromyko
conveyed to various Japanese officials the Soviet Union's
strong interest, despite the political complications asso-
ciated with the PFT, in developing mutual trade relations
on the basis of reciprocity and equality; but during a
November 1978 visit to Moscow, Satoshi Sumita, the president
of the Export-Import Bank was approached by Russian trade
representatives about the availability of large scale Japanese
bank loans for resource exploitation in Siberia under Moscow's
194
next five year plan. Japanese steel producers were also
contracted to export 200,000 tons of large diameter pipe
195
to the Soviet Union during the last quarter of 1978,
and Moscow has dropped threats made during the course of the
PFT negotiations to retaliate against such a treaty by
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denying Japan any fishing rights in the Soviet 2 00 mile
economic zone unless Tokyo rescinded its claim to the
19 6
"Northern Territories."
Their tough talk about "grave consequences" aside,
the actual conclusion of the PFT probably forced the
realization amongst the Soviet leadership that a policy of
intimidation was not likely to be effective against a Japan
allied with the U.S. and aligned with China. In fact, Soviet
concerns that a continued atmosphere of confrontation might
lead Tokyo to seriously consider the benefits of an anti-
Soviet tripartite pact with Washington and Peking are far
197from groundless. As a result, the Kremlin has decided,
for the time being at least, that the deferment of difficult
political issues, such as the "Northern Territories" dis-
pute, while offering the Japanese an array of economic
opportunities is the best way to overcome the anti-Soviet
connotations of the PFT.
This strategy has the added advantages of playing
to the Japanese desire to demonstrate that the PFT is not
directed against Moscow, and of providing the Soviets with
the technology and capital they need for the development of
Siberia. Along these same lines, any technology or capital
made available to the Soviets means a reduction in the
amount the Japanese could offer to the Chinese. From this
perspective, the Soviets may be optimistic that increased
trade with Japan might drive a wedge between Tokyo and Peking
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by reducing Japan's ability to contribute to the fulfillment
of Chinese modernization and strengthening the Soviet
military-economic infrastructure in the Far East.
The Japanese are anxious to show the Soviets, as
well as the Chinese, that they are sincere in their professions
about an omnidirectional foreign policy designed to promote
friendly relations with all nations. This not only makes
good political sense in terms of avoiding the Sino-Soviet
conflict, but it also maximizes Japan's economic options by
diversifying its sources of raw materials and markets. The
improved economic relations the Soviets are seeking has the
additional advantage for the Japanese of checking Chinese
temptations to use Japan's trade dependency as a means of
forcing Tokyo into an anti-Soviet foreign policy or to
extract unreasonable prices for Chinese resources.
Responding to the Soviets ' measured reaction to the
PFT, the Japanese have decided to reverse a previous decision
and to negotiate a long term economic cooperation agreement
with the Soviet Union. Such an agreement was first proposed
by Brezhnev in 19 7 6 but rejected by the Japanese for fear that
their claims to the "Northern Territories" might be forgotten
19 8in the rush of economic success. " In explaining this new
policy, Prime Minister Fukuda indicated, that for the sake
of improved relations with the Soviet Union, Japan would
separate economic matters from political and territorial
issues, but in return would expect a senior Soviet official
199
to visit Japan in 1979.
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Analogizing to the PFT, the Japanese are apparently
hopeful that the natural economic forces drawing Japan and
the Soviets together can be used not only for financial profit,
but to establish the basis for a political settlement returning
the four "Northern Territories" islands, which in turn would
clear the way for negotiations on a Japanese-Soviet peace
treaty needed for full normalization of relations.
Under the present circumstances of Japan wanting to
participate in Siberian resource development projects to
prove that the PFT is not anti-Soviet, and Moscow's desire
to use economics to prevent Japan from becoming enmeshed in
China's streategy of containing the Soviet Union, traditional
political-economic analysis would predict a substantial
increase in Japanese-Soviet trade as a result of the PFT.
A rapid improvement in Japanese-Soviet economic
cooperation was also predicted after the unexpected warming
of Sino-American relations in 1971, as both Moscow and Tokyo
expressed concern over the future direction of American policy
in Asia. This momentum toward increased economic coopera-
tion was stifled, however, by Prime Minister Tanaka's visit
to Peking in September 1972, resulting in renewed Soviet
intransigence on the return of the "Northern Territories"
and the economic terms Moscow was insisting on as the price
for Japanese participation in Siberian resource development
projects. Not only was the Kremlin requesting an excessive
amount of credits at low interest rates normally reserved for
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third world nations, but it also wanted to repay these
loans with goods in kind on a deferred basis.
Besides the investment risks, Tokyo was also appre-
hensive about participating in any economic projects that
would enhance Soviet military power in the Far East. The
strategic implications of the Tyumen Oil Fields Project and
201the construction of the Baikal-Amur Railroad (BAM) for
easing the logistics burden on Soviet troops deployed along
the Chinese border and naval units operating from Vladivostok,
indicated to the Japanese leadership that the Soviets were
trying to use Siberian resources to involve Japan in Moscow's
202
anti-China strategy. As a result of these factors, plus
Tokyo's belief that Moscow needed Japanese capital and
technology more than Japan needed Russian resources, serious
discussions on joint economic projects came to a halt by
1975. 203
These same conditions which brought earlier schemes
for Japanese investment in Siberia to abeyance still persist.
Consequently, the continued identification of national pride
with the "Northern Territories" question, the minimal guar-
antees on return of investment offered by the Soviets, the
strategic implications on the Asian military security equa-
tion, and the mutual overestimation by each side of its
importance to the other, suggest that old stumbling blocks
in Japanese-Soviet relations will considerably dampen any




Nonetheless, the failure of Moscow's harsh attitude
towards Japan since the Chou-Tanaka summit to either entice
Japanese investment or prevent the improvement of Sino-
Japanese relations, and Tokyo's current desire to take
advantage of the leverage provided by the PFT and the Sino-
American normalization to improve relations with the Soviet
Union, the volume of Japanese-Soviet trade should increase
as a result of the PFT. This expectation is given further
substance by post PFT statements from Tokyo and Moscow that
economics holds the key to the future of Japanese-Soviet
relations. To the degree that the PFT forces the Soviet
Union to seek Japanese trade to foster Siberian development
as well as to maintain a balance of power in East Asia, the
treaty will add to Japanese prosperity, while also enhancing
Japan's security and status in East Asia.
3 . The PFT's Impact on Japanese-American Economic Relations
Japan and the U.S. are the two largest market econo-
mies in the world, with America being Japan's foremost trading
partner (21%) and Japan being the United States' second leading
205trading partner (11%) . Despite the magnitude of this
bilateral trade, competition between Japan and the U.S. for
resources and markets is increasing, and the friction caused
by Japan's growing trade surplus is becoming acute. Because
of the new trading opportunities with China and the Soviet
Union made possible by the PFT, a central issue for the
future of the Japanese economy will be whether the treaty
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helps to move Japanese-American economic relations in a
more cooperative or competitive direction.
There is no questioning the central role the U.S.
played in stimulating Japan's post World War II "economic
miracle", but since 1976 the Japanese have been smarting
under Washington's increasing criticism of Tokyo's failure
to reduce its balance of payments surplus with the U.S.
From 1975, the U.S. deficit rose from $1.7 billion to a
2 6
staggering $11.6 billion in 1978 and has become a signifi-
cant irritant in Japan's overall relations with the U.S.
Besides straining economic relations, the deficit is
beginning to taint the American security commitment. Business,
labor, and political leaders in the U.S. point out that the
$1 billion a year it costs to maintain 47,000 servicemen
in Japan amounts to a "free ride" on American .defense coat-
tails, and in effect is a subsidy for the Japanese economy.
As a result, rightwing Japanese are growing concerned about
whether or not a lightly armed Japan can, in all instances,
forfeit its defense to an American disenchanted with Japan's
. . . 208
economic policies.
In the immediate future, the PFT is not likely to
improve Japanese-U.S . economic relations, despite the opti-
mism in Tokyo that PFT generated trade, primarily with China
and secondarily with the USSR, will reduce the balance of
payments problem by relieving the pressure to maintain as
high a level of export trade with the U.S. as in the past.
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In fact, the Japanese trade surplus with the U.S. is a
nultifaceted economic problem that could be worsened,
rather than improved by the new trading patterns associated
with the PFT.
The Japanese economy must be institutionally struc-
tured to encourage the formation of sufficient trade sur-
pluses so that enough capital will be available to pay for
essential imports of food, raw materials, and energy. As
a result, the Japanese - U.S. trade gap is a function of
Tokyo's concentration on exports, the economics of trading
finished goods for raw materials, a tight import policy,
the yen's appreciation in value, and Japan's slowed rate of
economic growth. In terms of improving economic relations
with the U.S. by decreasing the bilateral trade deficit,
the PFT can only help marginally by allowing Japan to volun-
tarily meet Washington's demands for a reduction in Japanese
exports
.
Peking's decision to use large purchases of expen-
sive Japanese manufactured goods and technology to implement
its modernization program should mean that Tokyo can easily
improve its balance of payments situation with the U.S. by
diverting a larger share of its exports into the expanding
Chinese market. But these same Sino-Japanese trade agreements
that lessen the importance of the American export market to
the Japanese may also lead to an increase in the U.S. trade
deficit with Japan by further reducing the American share
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of Japan's tightly controlled import markets. As a workshop
nation, food, raw materials, and energy account for 78
percent of Japan's total imports, meaning that as the impor-
tation of Chinese natural resources increases, Japanese
demand for American raw material imports, particularly
i • , , , , • 209coal, will decline.
Because of strong protectionist measures for Japanese
agricultural plus the intense competition from Western
Euopre and the emerging industrial states in Asia for a
share of Japan's limited market for imported manufactured
goods, there is little opportunity for the U.S. to recoup
its share of the Japanese import market lost to Chinese
natural resources. Consequently, because the PFT will proba-
bly result in a net reduction of U.S. imports to Japan by
giving preference to Chinese raw materials so Peking can
afford Japanese finished goods, the treaty is not apt to
have a positive effect in immediately easing the tensions
associated with Japan's large trade surplus with the U.S.
Besides not encouraging any increase in U.S. imports,
the PFT will not give Tokyo any new options for attacking
the other causes of U.S. trade deficit problem. The removal
of trade barriers, the yen's appreciation in value, and the
domestic economic growth rate are all areas where Japan's
new treaty relations with China will have only a minimal
impact at best.
Trade barriers to foreign imports are a function of
Japanese domestic politics and the dynamics of Japan's
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complex distribution system. Once needed to protect key
sectors of the Japanese economy from foreign competition
while Japan recovered its strength from World War II, these
barriers are now used to protect Japan's balance of payments
situation. Obviously, nations like the U.S., which allow
Japanese goods to enter duty free, see these non-tariff
barriers as unfair and a root cause of their balance of
payments deficit with Tokyo. But, because China will proba-
bly never be an exporter of food, and is some years away
from being able to offer manufactured goods for export, the
PFT puts little if any pressure on the Japanese Diet to
reduce protective tariffs for the politically powerful
agricultural lobby or cause the entrenched Japanese retail
system to curtail its practice of marking up the price of
imported goods at each stage of distribution.
Appreciation of the yen is another area where the
PFT is ineffective in adjusting Japan's trade surplus.
Over time, yen appreciation will increase domestic Japanese
demand for foreign imports by making them relatively cheaper,
and decrease the demand for Japanese exports by making them
comparatively more expensive. In the short run, however,
this shift in trade volume lags considerably behind the rise
in the yen value, resulting in an increase in Japan's trade
surplus account as the yen appreciates faster than exports
fall off. Clearly, the PFT and its associated trade agree-
ments can do little to arrest the upward valuation of the
yen, which is a function of the declining dollar and the
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desirability of Japanese goods, or to accelerate the
surplus reducing effect of this appreciation, which normally
takes as long as two years.
An increase in the rate of economic growth is probably
the single most important variable for increasing Japanese
demand for imports and improving the Japanese-U.S . economic
relations. The sale of finished goods and technology to
China as a result of the PFT should stimulate Japanese growth,
but this effect will hardly be noticed because of the current
business recession and the dampening effect of Prime Minister
Ohira's decision to reduce government spending in order to
control the national debt. Not only has Japan failed to
meet Fukuda ' s pledge to President Carter of achieving a 7
percent overall growth rate in 1978, but Ohira is now pro-
jecting a 6.3 percent increase in the GNP as the target for
2101979. Even with the projected increase in China trade,
some private Japanese economic research organizations are
less optimistic about Japan's economic growth potential,
predicting an increase of between only 4 to 5 percent for
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19 79. Rather than a stimulant to economic growth, the
PFT is probably more accurately characterized, at present,
as a needed prop for an economy sagging from overcapacity.
In the long run, Japan's new trading agreements with China
should contribute to the renewal of strong economic growth
necessary to meet foreign demands for increasing Japan's
import levels. Until the anticipated China trade matures,
134

however, the PFT will not be a source or cause of imports
needed to reduce Japan's trade surplus with the U.S.
Consequently, in a bilateral setting, the prospects
of the PFT contributing to Japan's efforts to meet American
demands for reducing the Japanese balance of payments sur-
plus are not promising. This is not surprising because the
PFT and its economic fallout do not represent any shift away
from the basic Japanese concept of exporting high priced
technologically intensive manufactured goods to pay for less
expensive raw materials. Furthermore, as Tokyo diversifies
its sources of raw materials, which account for the bulk of
Japanese imports, the U.S. opportunities for closing the
bilateral trade gap with Japan become more and more limited
to retaliatory protectionism.
None of this analysis should be construed to mean,
however, that if the PFT were not signed Japan's economic
relations with the U.S. would have automatically improved.
With or without the PFT, Tokyo's protective trade policies,
the escalating value of the yen, and Japan's reduced rate
of economic growth are important features of the Japanese
economic system and would work to maintain the momentum
towards a large Japanese surplus with the U.S. Though not
likely to ease the pressure from any of these economic factors
causing this surplus, the PFT does give Tokyo added bargaining
power with which to resist unilateral American schemes to
reduce its trade deficit that might be burdensome to the
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Japanese economy or politically unacceptable to the Japanese
electorate.
In a multilateral longer ranged setting, the economic
aspects of the PFT take on a more positive tone for Japanese-
American trade relations. As China's new trade links with
Japan hasten industrial modernization, the enormity of the
Chinese market will, even in Tokyo's eyes, be sufficient to
accommodate a large influx of American manufactured goods
and investment capital without detriment to Sino-Japanese
212
arrangements. With the normalization of Sino-American
relations, many Japanese now see the possibility of a coopera-
tive division of labor developing between Japan and U.S.
interests for the efficient cultivation of the Chinese import
market. From the Japanese perspective, the degree to which
the U.S. can establish its own balance of payment surplus
with China, or any other major Japanese trading partner, the
less Washington has to be concerned about its bilateral trade
213deficit with Tokyo. In fact, the economic impact of the
PFT and the normalization of Sino-American relations should
allow the negative impact of Japan's trade surplus with the
U.S. to be offset in the future by China recycling some
appreciated yen it receives from the sale of its natural
resources to purchase relatively cheaper American manufac-
tured goods priced in dollars.
Japan's economic relationship with the U.S. has been
growing progressively more competitive in the 1970' s, and
the PFT has no significant potential for easing this tension,
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because it is a product of this competitiveness. By
establishing China as an alternate source of supply and
demand for the Japanese economy, the PFT signals Tokyo's
intention to become more independent of American economic
policy. This suggests that Japan's trade surplus problem
with the U.S. will not improve because of Japanese reluctance
to tamper with the profitable structure of their export led
economy. Tokyo contends that its lack of natural resources
leaves it little choice but to promote exports in order
to pay for needed primary imports
.
The economic inroads to China made possible by the
PFT, reduce Japan's reliance on the U.S. and diversifies
its trading patterns , but the treaty does little more to
solve the problem of Japan's worsening trade suprlus problem
with the U.S. than give Tokyo some additional time before
Washington considers serious unilateral corrective measures.
PFT or not, the U.S. continues to be the major market for
Japanese exports and the guarantor of Japanese security.
Consequently, the key question in Japanese-U.S . economic
relations is, to what degree and for how long can Tokyo
maintain a balance of payments surplus with Washington before
the American leadership institutes protectionist retaliation
against Japanese imports or reassesses its security commitment?
With a trade surplus of $9.8 billion projected for
214
1982, the same economic difficulties Japan is currently
experiencing with the U.S. could be repeated with China. The
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PFT in tandem with the full normalization of Sino-American
relations, however, presents Tokyo with an opportunity to
contribute to the formation of a new system of multilateral
trade that stresses the complementary aspects of Japan,
China, and the United States 1 economic interdependence.
Within such a trading network, where sufficient supplies of
raw materials, energy, manufactured goods, technology, invest-
ment capital, and food would be available to all three coun-
tries, Japan could easily maintain the prosperity of its
export led economy, reduce the pressures of bilateral trade
surpluses with two of its most important trading partners,
minimize the likelihood of American protectionist tactics,
insulate itself against drastic alterations in the value
of the yen, and stabilize its access to export markets and
sufficient supplies of necesssary raw materials.
On the whole, the PFT is an emphatic statement of
Japan's growing economic independence from the U.S., which
for the immediate future will not alleviate the causes or
resulting problems from Tokyo's increasing trade surplus
with Washington. Nor, however, does the treaty diminish the
nautral interdependence that exists between the Japanese and
American economies, suggesting that in the long run that the
PFT could provide an avenue along which Tokyo, Peking, and
Washington might pursue their common interests in a politically
stable expanding system of international trade. To the
extent that the PFT can accelerate the shift of Japanese-American
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trade relations from bilateralism to multilateralism, it
will ease economic and political tensions between Tokyo and
Washington, while contributing to the continued prosperity
of Japan.
C. THE IMPACT OF THE PFT ON JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL STATUS
Since the Meiji Restoration, a persistent theme in
Japanese foreign policy has been to displace the influence
of the western powers in Asia and establish Japan as the
preeminent state in the western Pacific. This leadership
aspiration ws suppressed by Japan's political stigmatization
and economic devastation after World War II, which resulted
in Tokyo retreating from controversial political issues in
order to maximize its economic options. But Japan's "trading
company" approach to foreign policy has been so successful
that like a multinational corporation, Tokyo can no longer
ignore the international ramifications of its economic deci-
sions. Denied the luxury of divorcing politics from economics,
Japan's traditional interests in being recognized as a shaper
of Asian events is experiencing a resurgence.
The PFT is reflective of Tokyo's renewed interest in
expanding its influence in Asia, with the treaty regarded by
many observers as the first indication that Japan is ready
to claim at least the mantle of regional economic leadership
and accept the political responsibilities incumbent upon this
215position. To promote and finance trade with China, as well
as with other Asian nations, Japan has already assumed a more
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visible posture in international economic circles such as
the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade Talks, where it
is suggesting its own strategies, independent of the U.S.
or Western Europe, for stabilizing the international mone-
216tary system. Furthermore, the formulas devised to finance
the expansion of Sino-Japanese trade will probably serve as
a model for Japan's trading relations with other less
217developed countries in Asia.
The PFT is noteworthy alone because it represents Chinese
recognition of Japan's de facto economic leadership in the
eastern hemisphere. During his October 1978 Tokyo visit,
Teng left no doubt that China needed Japanese assistance to
modernize its economy. Commenting directly on Chinese back-
wardness the First Vice Premier said, "when your face is
ugly you should not pretend to be beautiful" and "we have
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many things we can learn from Japan. " The prestige of
China, the historical center of Asian culture, politics,
and economics, seeking a more cooperative relationship with
Japan for security and economic reasons will undoubtedly
enhance Tokyo's influence throughout the Pacific basin.
China's desire to acquire Japanese technology also lifts
Japan's international confidence by reversing the historical
pattern of Japan borrowing from China.
Besides strengthening the economic basis for increased
Japanese regional influence, the PFT also establishes a
fundamental framework for future relations with China that
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not only improves Japan's strategic security, but also
increases Tokyo's opportunity to play a broader role in
maintaining regional stability. Complementing the security
treaty with the U.S., the PFT makes it less likely that the
Soviet Union would threaten the use of force against Japanese
interests, because Tokyo is now closely connected with
Moscow's two most powerful adversaries. In addition to
reducing the Soviet military threat, the PFT simultaneously
makes Tokyo less dependent on the American defense commit-
ment. Conversely, Japan's tilt towards China increases the
possibilities of Japanese involvement in some aspects of the
Sino-Soviet dispute, but from Tokyo's vantage point, improved
Sino-Japanese relations will stabilize the balance of power
in Asia and thereby reduce the chances of a serious confron-
tation between Peking and Moscow. The Kremlin's controlled
response, thus far, to the conclusion of the PFT tends to
substantiate Tokyo's belief that the PFT will be a stabilizing
influence for Asia.
The PFT is also central to Japan's omnidirectional
foreign policy of maintaining stability by promoting friendly
relations with all nations. The economic and political
advantages resulting from the PFT should serve as an induce-
ment to other countries, particularly the Soviet Union, to
follow the Chinese example and seek friendlier ties with
Japan.
Furthermore, by developing closer ties with Peking,
Tokyo is hopeful of being able to mediate Soviet and American
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differences with the Chinese. The importance Japan attaches
to being identified as a great power mediator is reflected
in Foreign Minister Sonoda's self-congratulatory interpre-
tation of Japan's consultative role in Peking and Washington's
219decision to normalize Sino-American relations. Japan's
new desire to play a more active role in Asian politics was
further confirmed by Tokyo's offer to involve itself in the
Sino-Vietnamese conflict as a mediator.
Additionally, Japan's closer alignment with China adds
considerable independence and flexibility to Japan's foreign
policy. By providing Japan with an alternative source of
raw materials and markets, along with a creditable counter
to Soviet conventional power, the PFT ended Tokyo's client-
patron relationship with the U.S. Japan's considerable
trade and the continuance of its security pact with the U.S.,
however, means that Peking will not be in a position to
dominate the future development of Sino-Japanese relations
.
The Soviets, with their vested strategic interest in not
wanting to see China strengthened by closer ties to Japanese
industry and technology, are encouraged by the PFT to outbid
the Chinese for greater influence in Tokyo. Amazingly,
the PFT has expanded Japan's area for diplomatic maneuver at
very little cost, since economic competition was already
driving Japanese-U. S . relations in the direction of greater
independence and Japanese-Soviet relations were in decline
since the Chou-Tanaka summit.
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In general, the PFT contributes to Japan's prestige and
influence in Asia by allowing Tokyo a freer hand in designing
its own foreign policy. The treaty accomplishes this by
strengthening Japan's economic base, bolstering its security,
promoting regional stability, and increasing Japan's diplo-
matic options. But the latitude Japan enjoys as a result
of the PFT only serves to underscore the contradiction between
Japan's cultural insularity and the contemporary requirements
for an energetic international involvement if the Japanese
are to have the security, prosperity, and status they seek.
Unfortunately, the PFT offers Tokyo no ready solution to this
contradiction or how Japan can use its new position of
importance to maximum advantage.
In any event, the experiences surrounding the conclusion
of the PFT have proven to the Japanese that they can influence
the outcome of major economic and political issues on a
regional as well as a global scale. The PFT has also shown
that Japan has sufficient strength and prestige to deal
effectively with the superpowers. Furthermore, Japan's new
linkage with a modernizing China, guarantees that Tokyo's
potential reaction to any policy changes in Asia will be
carefully considered by Washington and Moscow. Nor should it
be forgotten that the dramatic diplomatic breakthrough repre-
sented by the PFT was achieved without Japan having to alter
its security relations with the U.S., reconsider its consti-
tutional postscription against the use of military force as
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an instrument of national policy, or change the structure
of its export led economy. This infers that Japan's inter-
national position is strong and that the rest of the world
may have to adjust to the way Japan conducts its foreign
policy, while the Japanese move cautiously towards the more
activist diplomatic tradition required by the interdependent




The PFT is a benchmark in the evolution of Japan's
foreign policy. By codifying the recommendations of the
Chou-Tanaka communique, the 197 8 Tokyo-Peking accord formally
ended the American domination of Japanese diplomacy, revita-
lized Japan's historical closeness to China, and served
notice on Moscow that the Japanese considered the Soviet
Union to be the major threat to their security. The decision
to sign the PFT also indicated that Japan's almost complete
dependence on foreign raw materials and export markets for
its national survival was, after 100 years, beginning to
modify its culturally induced xenophobia. By signing the
treaty despite American ambivalence and Soviet opposition,
the Japanese signaled the superpowers that it was ready to
depart from its past international reticence in order to
play a more active and independent role in shaping a pattern
of regional and global stability compatible with Japanese
national interests.
An analysis of why Tokyo pursued the PFT to fruition
highlights, in a contemporary setting, the basic national
interests that have driven Japan's foreign policy since the
Meiji Restoration. By aligning Japan with China, the treaty
provides an implicit complementary security alternative to
the American alliance; contributes to Japan's prosperity
by diversifying its sources of raw materials and opening up
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the China market to Japanese manufactured goods; and enhances
Japan's international prestige by demonstrating its diplo-
matic independence and underscoring Peking's recognition of
its need for Japanese assitance in achieving the "four
modernizations.
"
As a reflection of the continuing centrality of security,
prosperity, and status in Japan's foreign policy, the PFT
also manifests three recurring thematic patterns in Tokyo's
pursuit of its national interests.
First, there is the dominance of China in Japanese
foreign policy considerations, based on size, proximity,
and a cultural affinity. Through diplomacy, trade, and
war Japan has, since the seventh century, consistently sought
to strengthen itself through closer ties with China.
Second, Tokyo since the Restoration has viewed the
Russians as Asian interlopers, competitors for influence in
China, and an ominous threat to Japanese security. As a
result, modern Japan has periodically attempted to neutralize
Moscow's power in Asia by allying itself with Russia's
strongest adversary. The PFT is actually the fourth such
agreement concluded in the past 77 years, with the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance of 1902 setting the precedent for the
Tripartite Pact with Germany in 1940, and the American
Security Treaty of 1951.
Third, Japan's foreign policy is subordinate to domestic
issues and the rigors of consensus politics. Prime Minister
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Fukuda was able to build a consensus for the PFT only because
virtually every participant in Japan's policy making process
— the LDP, the opposition parties, the governmental bureau-
cracies, the business community and public opinion — saw
increased commercial contact with China rejuvenating the
Japanese recession burdened economy. The fact that it took
six years to create this consensus and that Fukuda could not
translate such a monumental foreign policy success into
electoral victory, testifies to the priority domestic issues
have over foreign policy concerns. This same phenomenon
of foreign policy issues serving domestic interests was
also at the root of Japan's isolation during the Tokugawa
period, its imperialistic behavior after the Meiji Restora-
tion, and its "trading company" approach to international
relations following the American Occupation.
In addition to confirming the basic attributes of
Japanese foreign policy, the PFT also portends significant
alterations for the matrix of strategic, economic and diplo-
matic relations in East Asia. The basis for these changes
is the broadened array of policy options made possible by
Japan's closer ties with China, and Tokyo's reawakened
desire to use its growing international influence.
Strategically, the PFT represents a dramatic tilt
towards China, and by implication associates Tokyo with
Peking's policy of Soviet containment. This has obviously
further sensitized already raw Soviet-Japanese relations,
making doubtful Russian concessions on the "Northern
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Territories", fishing rights, and Siberian investment pro-
jects. On the other hand, Japan's importance to China's
containment strategem and economic modernization program
have induced Peking to at least appear to be more considerate
of Japanese interests in Korea, the East China Sea, Taiwan,
and Southeast Asia. To avoid being trapped into supporting
Peking's anti-Soviet policies, Tokyo must maintain its strong
security ties with the United States and affirmatively use
its economic influence at every opportunity to convince the
Kremlin that the PFT is not an alliance directed against the
Soviet Union.
Besides affecting Japan's bilateral relations with its
two communist neighbors, the PFT ' s most serious long-range
impact will probably be on the future course of Sino-Soviet
relations. Without a serious rift existing between Moscow
and Peking, the PFT could not have occurred, but this con-
tinuing hostility, which makes Japan important to the security
calculations of both China and the Soviet Union, also repre-
sents the greatest threat to the stability Japan needs for
its security and prosperity. The most immediate danger is
that by enhancing China's strategic position, the PFT could
trigger a region wide conflict by inadvertently encouraging
precipitous Chinese actions — as in Vietnam, or by a pre-
emptory Soviet attack to prevent China from translating it
Japanese acquired technology into military strength. Further-
more, the more successful the treaty is at increasing Japan's
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influence in the western Pacific, the greater the chance that
Peking and Moscow will find it mutually beneficial to put
aside their differences and concentrate on jointly containing
Japan. For these reasons, Japan's security ties with the
United States take on added significance. Not only does a
strong American military presence dampen the impetus for
armed conflict between the Soviets and the Chinese, but it
also insulates Japan against the effects of either a Sino-
Soviet confrontation or rapprochement.
Economically, the PFT is already a financial bonanza for
Japan. Besides reducing Japanese dependence on Middle East
oil, the increasing Chinese demand for Japanese goods has
allowed Tokyo to respond voluntarily to American pressures
for a reduction of Japanese imports without fear of a domes-
tic backlash. The potential for mutual economic stimulation,
that caused both sides to defer the settlement of difficult
issues between them so that the PFT could be concluded, is
however, not likely to last. Consequently, these unresolved
issues, such as soveriegnty over the Senkaku ' s , will resur-
face as significant friction points the more rapidly China
assimilates Japanese industrial technology. As China
modernizes, the less it will need Japanese imports and the
more it will need its own natural resources. By provisioning
China with the technology and financing it needs to modernize
its industrial base, the PFT may also be laying the foundation




Perhaps the most certain and lasting impact of the PFT
will be on Asian trading patterns. Since raw materials
account for the bulk of Japanese imports, Tokyo's agreement
in principle to buy Chinese resources so that Peking will
have sufficient foreign exchange to pay for Japanese imports
,
means that Tokyo's demand for natural resources from Southeast
Asia and the United States will drop, unless the new China
trade results in a large and unexpected spurt in economic
growth for Japan. Any significant decline in Japan's impor-
tation of high priced raw materials from Southeast Asia or
the United States is certain to increase Tokyo's trade
surplus and exacerbate pressures in ASEAN and Washington for
protectionist measures against Japanese goods. The threat
of such a disruption in its established markets could cause
Japan's business and political elites to consider lowering
existing barriers to foreign agricultural and manufactured
goods
.
In another vein, Japan's position as the second largest
market for Middle East oil after the United States, means
that the PFT could have a major impact on the international
oil economy. If Japan can obtain 15 percent of it oil require-
ments from China by 1990 as called for by current projections,
such a reduction in demand could cause a glut of Middle East
oil on the world market, which would moderate the price of
crude and the cartel behavior of OPEC. If the PFT can
lower the price of energy by encouraging the return of a
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more competitive system for oil pricing, this would amount
to a de facto stimulant for economic growth in Japan and
all other industrialized western nations.
Diplomatically, the PFT signifies an end to Japan's
tacit acceptance of its client-patron relationship with the
United States, and reestablishes Tokyo's pre-World War II
position as a political power center in East Asia. Allied
with Washington, aligned with Peking, and courted by Moscow,
the PFT makes Japan probably the best diplomatically connected
nation in the world. The complementary aspects of the PFT
and the American Security Treaty bolster Japan's international
position, reduce the likelihood of Tokyo having to choose
between Washington or Peking, and assure the Japanese govern-
ment that neither power will be able to dictate Japan's
foreign policy. This informal American-Chinese-Japanese
federation also allows Tokyo to more effectively resist
Soviet attempts at political or economic intimidation and
encourages the Kremlin to negotiate in good faith on out-
standing issues in Soviet-Japanese relations' — not the
least of which is the conclusion of a formal peace treaty.
Additionally, the Japanese are hopeful that as a result of
the PFT they will be able to offer their good offices with
Peking and Washington as an honest broker for reducing ten~
sions associated with Sino-Soviet, Sino-American, and
Soviet-American relations. In short, the PFT has increased
Japan's diplomatic access to the nations most crucial to
ultimate stability in the Pacific basin.
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Another way of assessing the impact of the PFT is to
speculate on what might have been had Japan not signed the
treaty. To begin with, if Japan had bowed to Soviet pressure
not to commit itself to any anti-hegemonic treaty with
China, this probably would have only marginally improved
Soviet-Japanese relations, but would have exasperated
China's patience, and caused a sharp deterioration in Sino-
Japanese relations. Without a political agreement, China
could not depend on Japanese technology and capital for its
"four modernizations." Consequently, if Peking had not
induced Japan to put aside its concerns about Soviet reac-
tion and sign the PFT, this might have caused the Chinese
either to scrap their modernization program, at great politi-
cal expense to its leadership, or turn to the west, or even
to the Soviet Union, for the necessary industrial expertise
and financing.
None of these options would be particularly attractive to
Japan. If Teng's moderate pragmatic policies were discredited,
he would probably be replaced by a radical ideologue more
concerned with fomenting revolution than creating stability.
Greater European and American involvement in Chinese develop-
ment would increase competition within the western bloc for
the lion's share of the China trade and further antagonize
economic relations between Japan, the United States, and
Western Europe. The worst scenario, of course, would be
the threat posed to Japanese security and economic interests
by a Sino-Soviet accommodation.
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Southeast Asia is another area where the non-existence
of the PFT could have significantly altered developments.
Sufficient reasons exist for believing that Vietnam may not
have agreed to conclude a peace and friendship treaty with
the Soviet Union had China not come to terms with Japan.
The PFT identified Japan with China's interests and this,
coupled with Tokyo's close association with ASEAN, made an
alliance with Moscow Hanoi's only plausible strategy for
countering China's growing strength and avoiding economic
isolation. Without the PFT it is less likely that the
Soviets would have been able to establish a beachhead in
Southeast Asia, and it is doubtful whether Vietnam would have
moved aggressively against Cambodia in the latter part of
1978 without such strong Soviet support. Surely there
must be some bureaucrats in the Japanese foreign ministry
wondering if the PFT was the catalyst for the chain reaction
of events that culminated with China's "punitive" invasion
of Vietnam in February 1979.
More positively, it is just as reasonable to wonder if
the current thaw in North and South Korean relations would
have occurred without the PFT. Another curious question is,
what affect did the PFT have on the timing of President
Carter's December 1978 decision to normalize relations with
Peking? Undoubtedly the pressure to normalize would have
been less intense had the American business community not
been inundated with publicity about the lucrative deals
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Japanese firms were able to negotiate as a result of the
PFT.
From this brief hypothetical discussion of what the
effects might have been on Sino-Soviet relations, the
hostilities in Southeast Asia, stability in Korea, and the
American decision to recognize China had the PFT not been
signed, the conclusion seems inescapable that the treaty
significantly changed the international context in East
Asia. More normaltively , the contextual changes wrought by
the PFT, with the exception of Southeast Asia, also appear
to be conducive to creating the stable environment Tokyo
needs for enhancing Japanese security, prosperity, and status.
In summation, the preceeding analysis shows that the
PFT opened a new chapter in Japanese foreign policy. Being
a departure from its previous "trading company" approach of
maximizing economic opportunities by maintaining a vague
non-commital attitude on complex international issues, the
PFT raised Japan's diplomatic voice and flashed a budding
willingness to use its economic strength to achieve greater
international influence. By expanding Japan's security,
economic, and diplomatic options, the improvement of bilateral
relations with Peking allows Tokyo the latitude of action
needed to paly a central role in determining events in Asia
instead of reacting to them. How Japan intends to apply its
newfound influence and what type of regional contextual
setting it sees as most suitable to its national interests
remains to be seen. What does not remain to be seen is the
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international significance of the PFT and its compatibility




TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP
BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
JAPAN AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, RECALLING WITH
SATISFACTION THAT SINCE THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ISSUED A JOINT
COMMUNIQUE IN PEKING ON SEPTEMBER 29, 1972, THE FRIENDLY
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND THE PEOPLES OF
THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE DEVELOPED GREATLY ON A NEW BASIS,
CONFIRMING THAT THE ABOVE MENTIONED JOINT COMMUNIQUE
CONSTITUTES THE BASIS OF THE RELATIONS OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP
BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND THAT THE PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED
IN THE JOINT COMMJNIQUE SHOULD BE STRICTLY OBSERVED,
CONFIRMING THAT THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS SHOULD BE FULLY RESPECTED,
HOPING TO CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN ASIA AND
IN THE WORLD,
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SOLIDIFYING AND DEVELOPING THE RELATIONS
OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES,
HAVE RESOLVED TO CONCLUDE A TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP
AND FOR THAT PURPOSE HAVE APPOINTED AS THEIR PLENIPOTENTIARIES:
JAPAN: MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SUNAO SONODA
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HUANG HUA
WHO, HAVING COMMUNICATED TO EACH OTHER THEIR FULL POWERS,
FOUND TO BE IN GOOD AND DUE FORM, HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
ARTICLE 1
1. THE CONTRACTING PARTIES SHALL DEVELOP RELATIONS OF
PERPETUAL PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ON
THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF MUTUAL RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY
AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, MUTUAL NON-AGGRESSION , NON-INTERFERENCE




THE TWO SIGNATORIES AFFIRM THAT IN MUTUAL RELATIONS ALL
DISPUTES WILL BE SOLVED BY PEACEFUL MEANS AND THAT THEY
WILL NOT RESORT TO ARMS OR THREAT OF ARMS ALONG WITH THE
AFOREMENTIONED VARIOUS PRINCIPLES AND THE PRINCIPLES OF
THE UN CHARTER.
ARTICLE 2
THE TWO SIGNATORIES WILL NOT SEEK HEGEMONY IN THE ASIAN
AND PACIFIC AREA OR ANY OTHER AREAS AND SHALL EXPRESS
OPPOSITION TO ANY ATTEMPT BY ANY OTHER COUNTRY OR GROUP OF
COUNTRIES TO ESTABLISH SUCH HEGEMONY.
ARTICLE 3
THE TWO SIGNATORIES, BASED ON THE SPIRIT OF GOODNEIGH-
BORLINESS AND FOLLOWING THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY,
RECIPROCITY, AND NONINTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S DOMESTIC
AFFAIRS, WILL STRIVE TO DEVELOP THEIR ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL
RELATIONS AND PROMOTE INTERCHANGE BETWEEN THEIR PEOPLES.
ARTICLE 4
THIS TREATY WILL NOT AFFECT THE STATUS [CHI I] OF EITHER
SIGNATORY IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES
.
ARTICLE 5
THIS TREATY WILL BE RATIFIED AND TAKE EFFECT ON THE DAY
WHEN RATIFICATIONS ARE EXCHANGED IN TOKYO, AT THE EARLIEST
POSSIBLE DATE.
THIS TREATY WILL BE EFFECTIVE FOR 10 YEARS AND REMAIN IN
EFFECT THEREAFTER UNTIL IT GOES OUT OF FORCE IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE FOLLOWING RULE:
EITHER OF THE SIGNATORIES SHALL BE ABLE TO TERMINATE
THIS TREATY AT THE TIME WHEN THE FIRST 10-YEAR TERM EXPIRES
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